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Abstract  
Most narratives on compulsory licensing of patented drugs typically present a 
chasm between two competing groups of stakeholders—on one end are the generic 
drug manufacturers who extol compulsory patent licensing as a viable means for 
facilitating the production of affordably priced life-saving generic drugs, and on the 
other end are the patented drug manufacturers who frown upon such generic drugs 
as mere copycats impinging innovation and development.  Set in the backdrop of a 
curious paradox underlined by India’s ailing healthcare sector but a thriving 
pharmaceutical industry, this paper chronicles the country’s past and continuing 
experience with compulsory licensing of patented drugs. It presents a comprehensive 
discussion on the existing international and domestic statutory framework for the 
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing in India, and also determines the extent 
to which the domestic law of the country is compliant with the international law 
with regards to the compulsory licensing of patented drugs. It analyzes the key 
arguments and findings in Bayer v. Natco, a landmark precedent involving the 
issuance of India’s first compulsory license for Nexavar, a patented life-enhancing 
drug prescribed in the treatment of certain types of advanced cancers.  In light of the 
conflicting stakes involved, this paper finally concludes by suggesting “middle path” 
strategies for balancing pharmaceutical innovation and access to healthcare in the 
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing in India. 
I. Introduction 
India ranks second amongst the most populous countries of the world,1 with a 
socio-economic fabric acutely fraught with unequal distribution of healthcare 
resources.2   Amongst the various impediments stifling the growth of India’s 
health sector is the rise in infectious and chronic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
dengue, and tuberculosis.3  This proliferation of diseases is attributable to a host of 
 
paper would not have materialized without the support and encouragement of Kanishka Bhutani. 
1. The World Factbook, as of July 2014, records India’s population as 1, 236, 344, 631, placing it 
second in rank to China with a population of 1,355,692,576. The World Factbook, CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 
2119rank.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).  
2. Ashok Vikhe Patil et al., Current Health Scenario in Rural India, 10 AUST. J. RURAL HEALTH 129, 
129 (2002) (“About 75% of health infrastructure, medical man power and other health resources 
are concentrated in urban areas where 27% of the [Indian] population live.”). 
3. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HEALTHCARE IN INDIA: EMERGING MARKET REPORT 2007 3 (2007), 
available at http://storage.globalcitizen.net/data/topic/knowledge/uploads/2009121892144290.pdf 
(“[S]ome communicable diseases once thought to be under control, such as dengue fever, viral 
hepatitis, tuberculosis, malaria, and pneumonia, have returned in force or have developed a 
stubborn resistance to drugs.”). 
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circumstances, viz. inequitable access to affordable healthcare,4 poor living and 
conditions and lack of hygiene,5 meagre supply of adequate vaccines,6 shortage of 
doctors and other medical professionals,7 and unhealthy food and lifestyle.8  
Despite the implementation of various government-funded health insurance 
programs and schemes,9 the failure of the Indian government to finance adequate 
healthcare facilities is laid bare by its own official data on record,10 which reveals 
that a large number of people in India fund their health needs through out-of-
pocket expenses.11  
 
4. ISABELLE JOUMARD & ANKIT KUMAR, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING HEALTH OUTCOMES AND HEALTH CARE IN INDIA 9 tbl.1, 
ECO/WKP(2015)2 (Economics Dep’t Working Paper No. 1184, Jan. 8, 2015), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP%282015%292
&docLanguage=En (reporting the findings of a 2014 survey conducted by the Credit Suisse 
Research Institute, which revealed that only 16% of the households in India have access to free or 
partially free public health care).   
5. Id. at 7 (“Most [Indian] households in rural areas do not defecate in a toilet or latrine . . . which 
leads to infant and child diseases (such as diarrhoea) and can account for much of the variation in 
average child height.”). 
6. Id. (“Vaccination rates for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, for measles and for hepatitis B are 
all much lower [in India] than in OECD and peer countries.”). 
7. Id. at 9 (reporting the findings of a 2012 survey conducted by the Ministry of Health & Family 
Welfare, which revealed that “10% of primary health care centres are without a doctor, 37% are 
without a laboratory technician and 25% without a pharmacist”). 
8. Nirmalya Dutta, What Ails India’s Healthcare System, THE HEALTHSITE (Aug. 18, 2012, 8:50 
AM), http://www.thehealthsite.com/diseases-conditions/what-ails-indias-healthcare-system/ 
(“While rural India battles third world diseases like malaria and dengue, rising urbanisation has 
led to the middle and upper classes being afflicted with ‘developed world’ lifestyle diseases like 
diabetes and obesity. A fast food culture, increased smoking and alcohol consumption has led to a 
rise in obesity related diseases like diabetes and cardiovascular ailments.”). 
9. See generally PUBLIC HEALTH FOUNDATION OF INDIA, A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTING 
HEALTH INSURANCE MODELS IN INDIA 23-39 (Jan. 31, 2011), (explaining the key features of the 
government-funded health insurance schemes in India). 
10. NATIONAL RURAL HEALTH MISSION, MISSION DOCUMENT 3 (2005-2012) (reporting that the Union 
(federal) government’s budgetary allocation for public healthcare was 1.3%, while the states’ 
budgetary allocation was 5.5% during 2005-12) [hereinafter MISSION DOCUMENT]. See also 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 
2014: HOW DOES INDIA COMPARE? 1 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Briefing-Note-
INDIA-2014.pdf (reporting that the “[t]otal health spending accounted for only 4.0% of GDP in 
India in 2012, less than half the OECD average of 9.3%,” and that  “India ranks well below the 
OECD average in terms of health expenditure per capita, with spending of only USD 157 in 
2012 .  . ., compared with an OECD average of USD 3484”). 
11. MONEER ALAM & R.P. TYAGI, INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, POPULATION RESEARCH CENTRE, 
A STUDY OF OUT OF POCKET HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON DRUGS AND MEDICAL SERVICES: AN 
EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF UP, RAJASTHAN AND DELHI XIX (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/reports/sereport/ser/ser_drug2910.pdf (“[A]lmost a fifth 
(18.5%) of the rural households and over a tenth (11.6%) of the urban households [in India] spend 
more than a quarter of their total consumption budget on health care.”). See also MISSION 
DOCUMENT, supra note 10, at 3 (reporting that people hospitalized in India during 2005-2012 
spent around 58% of their total annual expenditure, and that over 40% of such people borrowed 
heavily or sold their assets to cover their medical expenses). 
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A rather conspicuous paradox to India’s ailing state of healthcare is the 
country’s fast-emerging pharmaceutical sector, which appears to be broadly 
segregated into major groups, namely (a) multinational pharmaceutical 
corporations or pharmaceutical MNCs, and (b) domestic pharmaceutical 
corporations.12  While the domestic pharmaceutical corporations are “entirely 
India-owned,”13 the pharmaceutical MNCs operate in India through subsidiaries 
and “conduct varying degrees of drug manufacturing” and research within the 
country.14  A cottage industry of studies indicates that the domestic 
pharmaceutical corporations in India dominate in their presence over the 
pharmaceutical MNCs by commanding the lion’s share of the country’s 
pharmaceutical market.15  These domestic pharmaceutical corporations can be 
further segmented into two sub-groups—one composed of corporations that engage 
in original research and development (R&D) along with the manufacturing of 
“generic drugs,”16 and another consisting of small pharmaceutical companies 
that only reverse-engineer patented drugs or those that have gone off-patent.17  
Both the R&D-engaging domestic pharmaceutical corporations as well as those 
that solely manufacture generic drugs rely on compulsory licensing provisions under 
the India’s existing domestic and international patent laws to manufacture and export 
generic copies of patented life-saving drugs at highly subsidized rates.18  
This paper is a doctrinal study focusing on the enforcement of compulsory 
licensing of patented drugs in India.  Part II opens with a monologue chronicling 
the country’s past and continuing experience with the compulsory licensing of 
patented drugs, beginning from the days when India had developed notoriety as a 
“pirate” nation for copying drugs patented in other countries,19 until today, when it 
 
12. Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 532-42 (2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=923538. 
13. Id. at 532. 
14. Id. at 533-34. 
15. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, INDIA EMERGING: PHARMA’S EVOLVING BUSINESS MODELS 24 fig.19 
(2011) (indicating that MNCs operating in India hold a modicum 28% share of the country’s 
pharmaceutical market, while the remaining 72% share is held by the country’s domestic 
pharmaceutical corporations).  
16. Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/ 
informationondrugs/ucm079436.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (“A generic drug is the same as a 
brand name drug in dosage, safety, strength, how it is taken, quality, performance, and intended 
use. . . . By law, a generic drug product must contain the identical amounts of the same active 
ingredient(s) as the brand name product. Drug products evaluated as "therapeutically equivalent" 
can be expected to have equal effect and no difference when substituted for the brand name 
product.”). 
17. Mueller, supra note 12, at 536-37. 
18. See discussion infra Part III.A-B(analyzing the statutory provisions for the enforcement of 
compulsory patent licensing under the existing domestic and international patent laws of India) 
19. Mueller, supra note 12, at 514. 
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has earned respect from the international community for becoming the “pharmacy 
of the developing world.”20  Part III, thereafter, presents a comprehensive 
discussion on the international and domestic statutory framework for the 
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing in India, and also determines the 
extent to which the domestic law of the country is compliant with the international 
law with regards to the compulsory licensing of patented drugs.  Part IV attempts 
to collate the conflicting perspectives of the various stakeholders of compulsory 
patent licensing in the famous Bayer v. Natco case involving the issuance of India’s 
first compulsory license for a life-enhancing patented drug.  Part V concludes by 
suggesting plausible “middle-path” strategies for the effective enforcement of 
compulsory licensing of patented drugs in India.  
II. Chronicling the History of Compulsory Licensing of 
Patented Drugs in India 
A. Meaning and Essentials of a Compulsory Patent License 
A compulsory license is a government-enforced contract authorizing a generic 
drug manufacturer to manufacture and use a patented invention for a stipulated 
sum of compensation to the patentee of the invention.21  Such government or third-
party use of a patented invention is typically non-commercial in nature,22 and is 
needed in order to address a national need or to remedy an anti-competitive 
practice.23  Unlike a voluntary contract where there is consensus ad idem,24 the 
terms and conditions of a compulsory license are not mutually agreed upon by the 
 
20. Simon Reid-Henry & Hans Lofgren, Pharmaceutical Companies Putting Health of World’s Poor at 
Risk, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2012, 2:00 EDT), http://www.theguardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/ 2012/jul/26/pharmaceutical-companies-health-worlds-poor-risk. 
21. Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in 
PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004), available at 
https://www.law.ou.edu/faculty/facfiles/Ragavan-Final-Richmond.pdf (“Compulsory licenses [are 
defined] as involuntary contract[s] between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and 
enforced by the state.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs 
at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation, 
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857-58 (2003) (“Compulsory Licenses are generally defined as 
authorizations permitting a third party to make, use, or sell a patented invention without the 
patent owner’s consent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22. For a discussion on the non-commercial use of patented drugs through compulsory licensing, see 
generally Pier DeRoo, Public Non-Commercial Use’ Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical 
Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32 MICH. J.  INT’L. L. 347 (2011), available at 
http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol32/iss2/3/. 
23. Chien, supra note 21, at 859 (“While specific provisions vary, compulsory licenses are 
generally authorized in the event of undesirable behavior by the patentee, such as anti-
competitive, non-working, or blocking behaviour; in the event of ‘public need,’ such as 
government infringement or national emergency; or in the context of food and drugs.”).  
24. JAN M. SMITS, CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 63 (2014). 
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licensor and the licensee, but are imposed on them by the government.25  Further, 
the government that grants a compulsory license can also revoke or terminate it if 
the circumstances that led to the issuance of such a license cease to exist.26  
B.  Historical Overview of Compulsory Patent Licensing in India  
In 1947, when India transitioned from an English colony to a sovereign 
democracy, the country’s patent regime continued to be governed by the British-
enacted Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911,27 which permitted the patenting 
of pharmaceutical products.28  This, resultantly, barred the manufacturing of 
generic copies of patented drugs in India.  The availability and supply of patented 
drugs, therefore, was largely controlled by pharmaceutical MNCs, who mostly 
imported them into India and sold them locally at exorbitant prices.29  The 
unreasonably high pricing of patented drugs made them inaccessible to most in 
India, thus precipitating the need for providing a legitimate means for domestic 
pharmaceutical corporations to manufacture and sell generic copies of patented 
drugs at affordable prices within the country.30 
The Government of India, by a resolution dated January 10, 1948, appointed 
Justice (Dr.) Bakshi Tek Chand, a retired judge of Lahore High Court, to chair the 
Patents Enquiry Committee (1948–50), whose report published in 1950 
recommended provisions for enabling compulsory licensing “to counteract the 
misuse or abuse of patent monopolies in India.”31  Based on the recommendations 
of this report, the Patents Act of 1911 was amended, first in 195032 and 
 
25. Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come, 8 NW. J. INTI’L L. & BUS. 666, 667 (1987-1988) (“In compulsory licensing situations a 
court dictates the terms of the license, and the licensor’s wishes may be ignored.”). 
26.      Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating 
the Options, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 252-53 (2009). 
27. The Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, Act No. 2 of 1911, INDIA CODE (1911) available at 
http://www.theindianlawyer.in/statutesnbareacts/acts/d42.html [hereinafter Patents Act of 1911]. 
28. Mueller, supra note 12, at 508. 
29. Id. at 509-10. See also Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Unequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 280 (2006) (citing the findings of a 1961 U.S. Senate Committee report 
to emphasize that “Indian drug prices ranked among the highest in the world”).  
30. Mueller, supra note 12, at 510. 
31.      SHRI JUSTICE N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW 3 (Sept. 
1959), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/201678355/Ayyangar-Committee-Report#scribd 
[hereinafter AYYANGAR REPORT].  
32.  Mueller, supra note 12, at 511. See also THE PATENT OFFICE, INDIA, DRAFT MANUAL OF PATENT 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9 (3rd ed. 2008), [hereinafter DRAFT MPP]. Pursuant to the 1950 
amendment to the Patents Act of 1911, an application for a compulsory patent license could be 
filed on the following grounds, namely: (a) that the patented invention was not being commercially 
worked to its fullest extent in India; (b) that the demand for the patented invention in India was 
not being met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms; (c) that the importation of the 
patented invention was hindering its commercial working in India; (d) that the refusal of the 
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subsequently in 1952,33 to incorporate a framework for enforcing compulsory 
patent licensing in India.34  Despite the incorporation of compulsory patent 
licensing in the Patents Act of 1911, these provisions were rarely invoked due to 
the adversarial nature and high cost of litigation involved in deciding compulsory 
patent license applications.35 
As the compulsory patent licensing provisions under the Patents Act of 1911 
were rarely invoked, a need was felt to craft a more robust patent law system in 
the country.  Towards this end, in 1957, the Government of India appointed Justice 
N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, the then sitting judge of the Madras High Court, to chair 
 
patentee of the patented invention to voluntarily license his invention were hindering its 
commercial or industrial working in India; (e) that a market for the export of the patented 
invention manufactured in India was not being supplied; (f) that the working of any other 
patented invention that substantially contributed to the establishment or development  of 
commercial or industrial activities in India was being unfairly prejudiced; and (g) that the 
conditions imposed by a patentee while licensing his patented invention were unfairly prejudicing 
the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in India. Id. 
33.      Mueller, supra note 12, at 511. See also DRAFT MPP, supra note 32, at 9-10 (reporting that the 
1952 amendment to the Patents Act of 1911 resulted in providing a mechanism for issuing com-
pulsory patent licenses for food and medicines, insecticide, germicide or fungicide, or surgical or 
curative devices, and further, that such compulsory licenses could also be issued upon a notifica-
tion by the Central (federal) Government in India). 
34. Aside from the 1950 and 1952 amendments to the Patents Act of 1911, the recommendations of 
the Tek Chand Committee Report were also instrumental in the introduction of a patent reforms 
bill in in the Parliament (India’s federal legislature) in 1953. This bill, however, lapsed due the 
dissolution of one of the houses of the Parliament. DRAFT MPP, supra note 32, at 10. 
35. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 511 (explaining that compulsory licenses under the Patents Act of 
1911 were “rarely sought” because “patent owners retained the right to oppose the grant of such 
licenses and to appeal any such grants”). See also SUDIP CHAUDHURI, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF 
MANAGEMENT CALCUTTA, TRIPS AND CHANGES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT REGIME IN INDIA 29 
(Working Paper No. 535, Jan. 2005) (documenting the empirical findings of an earlier study 
conducted by the author in 1984, which revealed that due to “the hazards of obtaining a 
compulsory license,”  including “legal battles,” only five compulsory license applications were 
submitted until 1970, of which two were allowed, one was refused, and the remaining two were 
withdrawn). See also SHAMNAD BASHEER & MRINALINI KOCHUPILLAI, THE ‘COMPULSORY LICENSE’ 
REGIME IN INDIA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: A REPORT FOR THE JPO 1 (2005) (reporting without 
citation to authority two cases allowing the grant of a compulsory patent license under the 
Patents Act of 1911). One of the cases that allowed the compulsory license application was 
Raptakos, Brett & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Benger Laboratories Ltd., which was decided on July 28, 1950, 
and ruled, inter alia, that the patentee’s anticipated reduction in the price of its patented drug 
was not a valid opposition, and therefore, not a sufficient ground for refusing the grant of 
compulsory license to the applicant, especially when such license was being sought by the 
applicant for making generic copies of the patentee’s therapeutic drug available to the public at a 
reasonably affordable price.. Id. at 40-41. The second case that allowed a compulsory license 
application was NeoPharma Industries (P) Ltd. v. Parke Davis & Co., which was decided on 
November 23, 1965, and clarified, inter alia, that the admissibility requirements for an 
application filed under the Patents Act of 1911, seeking a compulsory license for a patented drug, 
did not require the applicant to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from the 
patentee of the drug. Id. at 42-43. 
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the Patents Revision Committee (1957–59),36 whose report published in 1959 
proposed “radical modifications” that went on to “form the backbone of the Indian 
patent system.”37  Notably, the Ayyangar Report premised its “radical 
modifications” on the following “three-pronged strategy”: first, identifying the types 
of inventions for which patent protection should be available; second, determining 
either to prohibit the granting of Indian patents to foreign entities or to require the 
working of such patents in India; and third, determining whether or not to 
withstand international pressures on India to join the prevailing international 
intellectual property conventions.38  The Ayyangar Report’s far-reaching 
modifications led to the enactment of the Patents Act of 1970,39 which thereby 
repealed the Patents Act of 1911.40   
The most notable features of the Patents Act of 1970 were its provisions 
revoking the patentability of pharmaceutical products in India.41  Section 5 of the 
Patents Act of 1970, while prohibiting patents on “substances intended for use, or 
capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug,”42 permitted patents on 
processes for making pharmaceutical compounds.43 As the Patents Act of 1970 
 
36. AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 31, at 4. See also JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, PATENT RIGHTS IN 
PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 46 (2010).  
37. Mueller, supra note 12, at 511-12 (explaining that the Ayyangar Report’s proposed “radical 
modifications” to then existing patent laws  of India were aimed towards accommodating the 
nation’s “ fledgling technological advancement and industrialization, the need to encourage and 
reward inventors, and the increasing number of Indian research institutes and emphasis on 
technical education ”). See also Ragavan, supra note 29, at 281 n.53 (“The Ayyangar Report, as 
modified by the Report of the Joint Committee of Parliament in 1966, forms the backbone of the 
Indian patent system.”). See generally AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 31, at 1-354. 
38. Mueller, supra note 12, at 512. 
39. The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (1970) [hereinafter Patents Act of 1970].  
40. Id. § 162(1) (“The Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, in so far as it relates to patents, is hereby 
repealed . . . .”). 
41. Mueller, supra note 12, at 512. See also Linda L. Lee, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent 
Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 290-91 (2008). See also 
Ragavan, supra note 29, at 285 (explaining that the Ayyangar Committee’s proposed modification 
to revoke the patentability of food and pharmaceuticals, which was eventually incorporated into 
the Patents Act of 1970, was justified because vesting product patents in food and 
pharmaceuticals could deny vast sections of India’s population access to such products, thereby 
violating their constitutional right to life and good health). 
42. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §§ 5(a)-(b). Please note that section 5 was eventually omitted 
when the Patents Act of 1970 was amended in 2005 to enable the patenting of pharmaceutical 
products in India. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.  
43. See id. § 5(b) (“[N]o patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances [intended for 
use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug] . . . , but claims for the methods or 
processes of manufacture shall be patentable.”) (emphasis added). See also Mueller, supra note 12, 
at 513 (“The Patents Act, 1970, also included expansive compulsory licensing provisions, such that 
patented processes for manufacturing substances capable of being used as medicine or food were 
deemed automatically endorsed with the designation licenses of right.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). See id. at 513 n.114 (citing examples of patented processes that were deemed to be 
endorsed as “licenses of right,” such as Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Controller Gen. of Patents, 
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expressly restricted pharmaceutical products from being patented, the years that 
followed saw an acute proliferation of domestic pharmaceutical corporations in 
India,44 making the country a leading producer of low-cost generic drugs in the 
world.45 
For more than two decades after the enactment of the Patents Act of 1970, 
India conscientiously refrained from swearing allegiance to the then prevailing 
international intellectual property (IP) instruments in order to ward off 
potentially huge IP costs that the developed countries of the world could impose 
on its domestic market.46  In fact, during the first three years of the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,47 India stoutly opposed the 
inclusion of IP protection within the GATT framework.48  Later, however, due to 
an economic slowdown in the late 1980s, India reversed its anti-IP stance.49  
Fearing trade barriers to its exports, withdrawal of textile tariff concessions, 
suspension of economic aid, etc., India signed the Trade-Related Aspects of 
 
1987 A.I.R. 77 (Calcutta H.C.), which affirmed the Controller of Patents’ order deeming the 
patentee-appellant’s patent—a catalyst useful in hydrocarbon reforming as well as a process for 
making the catalyst—to be subject to licensing of right). 
44. See YUSUF K. HAMEID, INDIAN PHARMA INDUSTRY: DECADES OF STRUGGLE AND ACHIEVEMENT 5 
(Apr. 2005) (observing that MNCs had controlled over 70% of the pharmaceutical market in India, 
but following the enactment of the Patents Act of 1970, the market share of MNCs fell below 
23%). Notably, the lack of patent protection to pharmaceutical products resulted in 
pharmaceutical MNCs restricting their business in India. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 513-14 
(“By fiscal year (FY) 1978-79, the number of foreign-owned patent applications filed in India had 
decreased to 1,010, less than one quarter of the 4,248 applications filed by non-Indians ten years 
prior in 1968.”). 
45. Drug prices in India plummeted to an all-time low following the enactment of the Patents Act of 
1970. Mueller, supra note 12, at 514 (“The eventual economic effect of the India Patents Act, 1970, 
was a dramatic increase in domestic generic drug manufacturing and a sharp decline in the price 
of medicines sold in India.  Pharmaceutical products patented outside of India could be freely 
copied in India under the Act, so long as the process by which they were produced did not infringe 
an Indian process patent . . . .”). See also id. at 515 (“For example, the price in 1998 of the Indian 
equivalent of ranitidine, the active ingredient in Glaxo’s Zantac anti-ulcer medicine, was over 100 
times less than the price of Zantac on the U.S. market.”).  
46. Mueller, supra note 12, at 512 (“By holding out against membership in the prevailing 
international IP conventions, India hoped to develop its economy independently without arm-
twisting from developed nations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter GATT]. The GATT began in 1947 with the objective of re-structuring and 
streamlining multi-lateral economic relations between its member countries. The Uruguay 
Round, formally launched in the September of 1986 at Punta del Este, Uruguay, was the 8th 
round of multi-trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the GATT, with the 
objective to enlarge the scope of trade negotiations to include areas such as IP and trade in 
services, and to reform trade in agriculture and textiles. For an overview of the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT and its implications for developing countries, see generally WAYNE SANDIFORD, 
GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1-8 (Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 1994).  
48. Mueller, supra note 12, at 517. 
49. Id. at 517-518. 
13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2015) 
342 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement on April 15, 199450, and 
subsequently, on January 1, 1995, it became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).51  
Since India did not have a system of affording patent protection to 
pharmaceutical products at the time it joined the WTO, it was granted a ten year 
transition period—from January 1, 1995 to January 1, 2005—to bring its domestic 
intellectual property law in line with the TRIPS Agreement.52  Consequently, 
the Patents Act of 1970 was amended in three phases: first, in 1999, to introduce 
a “mailbox facility”53 and to allow for “exclusive marketing rights (EMRs);”54 
second, in 2002, to modify India’s domestic provisions on the enforcement of 
compulsory patent licensing,55 to abolish the system of “licenses of rights,”56 and to 
 
50. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results 
of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
51. Mueller, supra note 12, at 518. For a cursory understanding the WTO and how it replaced the 
GATT as an international organization, see generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
INFORMATION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS DIVISION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9-21 (5th ed. 
2015).  
52. Mueller, supra note 12, at 518-19. See also id. at 518 (“India is viewed as the nation primarily 
responsible for the TRIPS’ multi-year transition periods, which the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry had vociferously opposed.”). 
53.     See The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1999, § 2, INDIA CODE (1999), available at 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.pdf (inserting § 5(2) into the Patents Act of 1970 for 
introducing provisions with respect to the “mailbox facility”) [hereinafter Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 1999]. The “mailbox facility” was a stop-gap arrangement wherein each 
pharmaceutical product patent application that was filed in India during the ten year 
transitional period afforded under the TRIPS Agreement—from January 1, 1995 to January 1, 
2005—was put into a symbolic “black box” and assigned a filing date. See Mueller, supra note 
12, at 519-22. Thus, as pharmaceutical product patenting was not in force during India’s 
transitional period between 1995 and 2005, the mailbox facility provided a “pipeline 
protection” of sorts to pharmaceutical product patent applications that were filed but could 
not be taken up for examination during this period. See id. at 519-20. 
54.      Patents (Amendment) Act of 1999, supra note 53, § 3 (inserting Chapter IVA into the Patents Act 
of 1970, containing provisions with respect to exclusive marketing rights). A select category of 
mailbox applicants, who met the requirements of § 24(B)(1) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 
1999, qualified for the grant of exclusive marketing rights (EMRs). See Mueller, supra note 12, at 
525. An EMR, if conferred, afforded the mailbox applicant an exclusive right to sell or distribute 
his invention in India for a period of five years from the date on which such right was conferred 
until such time the mailbox application was allowed and the patent was granted, or until the 
mailbox application was finally rejected, whichever was earlier. Id.   
55. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, § 39, INDIA CODE (2002), available at 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf (modifying Chapter XVI of the Patents Act of 1970 to 
introduce more grounds for enforcing compulsory patent licensing) [hereinafter Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 2002]. Pursuant to section 39 of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, the 
following three grounds for issuing a compulsory license under the Patents Act of 1970 were 
introduced, namely: (a) to prevent the abuse of patent rights resulting from the non-working of a 
patent, (b) to address cases of national emergency or extreme urgency, or for the purposes of a 
public non-commercial use, and (c) to work any other related patent. Id. For a detailed analysis of 
these grounds and how they are currently enforced under the Patents Act of 1970, see discussion 
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formally recognize India’s accession to United Nations’ affiliate World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO)57 administered Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property58 as well as  Patent Cooperation Treaty,59 and third, in 2005, 
(a) to extend patent protection to products such as food, drugs, chemicals, and 
micro-organisms,60 (b) to introduce compulsory license provisions for enabling the 
export of generic copies of pharmaceutical patented products to countries with no 
or insufficient manufacturing capacity for such products,61 and (c) to introduce 
reforms to the “new invention,” “inventive step,” and “new use exclusion” criteria of 
patentability.62  These three-phases of amendments to the Patents Act of 1970 
paved the way for a piecemeal implementation of pharmaceutical product 
patenting in India, which consequently resulted in precluding generic drug 
manufacturers in the country from manufacturing generic copies of patented 
 
infra Part III.B. 
56. Under section 87 of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 1999, process patents on food and medicines 
were automatically deemed to be endorsed as “licenses of right,” thus making them available for 
compulsory licensing three years after the grant of the patent. However, pursuant to section 39 of 
the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, the system of “license of right” was abolished. See V.K. 
Unni, Indian Patent Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Flexibility Framework in the Context of 
Public Policy and Health, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J.  323, 334 & n.117 (2012).  
57.      For an overview on the WIPO and how it operates in the international IP arena, see generally   
WIPO, About WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited June 30, 2015).  
58.      Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828  
U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinaf-
ter Paris Convention]. The Paris Convention came into force in India on December 7, 1998, effec-
tive which date the country  became obligated  to comply with its principles concerning—(a) na-
tional treatment, which forbids discriminatory treatment of foreign patent applications), and (b) 
right of priority, which allows foreign applicants, who have previously filed patent applications in 
their home countries, with a twelve-month priority period to file a patent application for the same 
invention in India while retaining the benefit of their earlier home country filing date. See 
Mueller, supra note 12, at 527. 
59.    Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160  U.N.T.S. 231, available at  
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf [hereinafter PCT]. The PCT came into force in India 
on December 7, 1998, effective which date India began accepting national phase filings of interna-
tional patent applications originally filed abroad. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 527. 
60. The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 4, INDIA CODE (2005), available at 
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf (omitting section 5 of the Patents Act of 1970, 
thus bringing an end to the restrictions on food and pharmaceutical product patenting in 
India)[hereinafter Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005].  
61. Id. § 55 (inserting Section 92A into the Patents Act of 1970 for allowing, through compulsory 
patent licensing, the export of generic copies pharmaceutical patented products to countries with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for such products). For understanding the requirements 
of filing a compulsory patent license application under section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970, see 
discussion infra Part III.B.1.d. 
62. The Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, supra note 60, §§ 2(f)-3(d) (modifying the definitions of 
“inventive step,” “new invention,” and “new use exclusion”). For a detailed analysis of the “new 
invention,” “inventive step,” and “new use exclusion” criteria of patentability under the Patents 
(Amendment) Act of 2005, see generally Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The 
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 THE INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 15, 20-25 (2005). 
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drugs, except by way of obtaining either a voluntary or a compulsory license in 
respect of such drugs.  
III. International and Domestic Statutory-Framework for the 
Enforcement of Compulsory Patent Licensing in India  
A. Enforcement of Compulsory Licensing of Patented Drugs under 
the TRIPS Agreement 
Section 5 of the TRIPS Agreement, inter alia, lays out a framework of 
substantive and procedural provisions for the enforcement of compulsory 
licensing.63  Although the expression “compulsory license” is not used anywhere in 
section 5, it’s concept and application is implicit in the “limited exceptions” to 
patent protection under article 30, 64 and is further implicit in the caption of article 
31 titled as “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder.”65  Article 31, 
at its very outset, states that a compulsory license for a patented invention may be 
issued to a private entity or the government, or to a third party authorized by the 
government.66  A private entity intending to obtain a compulsory license should 
have “made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions,”67 and such efforts should not have been 
successful within a reasonable period of time.68  Notably, the requirement for a 
compulsory license applicant to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary 
license from the patentee of an invention is dispensed with in situations of a 
national emergency or an extreme urgency,69 or for purposes of a public non-
commercial use,70 or for remedying anti-competitive practices.71  Moreover, a 
compulsory license may also be sought to work a related (second) patent, which 
cannot be worked without infringing an already existing (first) patent.72  
 
63.     For a quick reference of the precise grounds on which a compulsory license may be granted under 
the TRIPS Agreement, see infra Annexure I.A. 
64.     Chien, supra note 21, at 870 (“Article 30 authorizes general exceptions to patent protection, pre-
sumably including compulsory licensing, but states that these exceptions must neither unreason-
ably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate in-
terests of the patent owner.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65. Id. at 869-70 (stating that compulsory licensing is implicit in Article 31’s title, “Other Use Without 
Authorization of the Right Holder,” in that “[t]his provision permits WTO member countries to 
authorize compulsory licenses for use by the government or third parties subject to certain 
restrictions”). 
66.     See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 31.  
67. Id. art. 31(b).  
68. Id. 
69. Id.  
70. Id.  
71. Id. art. 31(k). 
72. Id. art. 31(l).However, the grant of  a compulsory license to work a (second) related patent is 
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Given that a compulsory license is contractual in nature, albeit imposed, it is 
enforced through a set of terms and conditions spelled out in Article 31,73 which 
include: first, that the authorized use of a patented invention through compulsory 
licensing should be non-exclusive;74 second, that such use should be non-
assignable;75 third, that such use should be predominantly for the supply of the 
licensee’s domestic market,76 except where such use is permitted to remedy an 
anti-competitive practice, in which case the licensee is permitted to manufacture 
and export generic copies of the patented invention to foreign markets;77 fourth, 
that the patentee should be paid adequate remuneration, taking into account the 
economic value of the authorization;”78 fifth, that the scope and duration of the 
authorized use should be limited to the purpose for which it is authorized, 
particularly in the case of semi-conductor technology, where the licensee must 
work the patented invention only for a public non-commercial use or to remedy an 
anti-competitive practice;79 and sixth, that such use shall be “terminated if and 
when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”80 
Further, article 31 directs the competent authority, deciding on the authorization 
of such use, to consider each request on its individual merits.81  Finally, the 
decision of the competent authority, allowing or dismissing the authorization of 
such use, including its decision on the quantum of remuneration payable to the 
patentee, shall not be final but subject to judicial review by a higher authority.82 
Notably, there are vital public health underpinnings to the enforcement of 
compulsory patent licensing, which come to the fore when articles 30 and 31 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, are read in conjunction with articles 8 and 27 therein, and are 
 
subject to the following three pre-conditions: first, that the related (second) patent shall involve an 
important technical advancement of considerable economic significance in relation to the already 
existing (first) patent; second, that the patentee of the already existing (first) patent shall be 
entitled, on reasonable terms, to a “cross-license” to use the related (second) patent; and third, 
that the compulsory license granted in respect of the already existing (first) patent shall be non-
assignable except with the assignment of the related (second) patent. Id. art. 31(l)(i)-(iii). 
73. For a quick reference of the precise terms and conditions subject to which a compulsory patent 
license may be granted under the TRIPS Agreement, see infra Annexure I.B. 
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 31(d). 
75.     Id. art. 31(e). 
76.     Id. art. 31(f). 
77.     See id. art. 31(k). Article 31(k), therefore, creates an exception to article 31(f), which otherwise lim-
its the authorized use of a patented invention to predominantly supplying the domestic market. 
See id. art. 31(k) read with art. 31(f). See also Chien, supra note 21, at 870 (“[U]nless the patentee 
has engaged in anti-competitive behavior, the [authorized] use [of a patented invention through 
compulsory licensing] must predominantly supply the domestic market.”).        
78. Id. art. 31(h). 
79. Id. art. 31(c).  
80. Id. art. 31(g). 
81. Id. art. 31(a). 
82.     See id. art. 31(i) read with art. 31(j). 
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further read with paragraphs 5(c) and 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health.83 While article 8 states that “[m]embers may . . . 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health,”84 article 27 allows member 
countries to exclude from patentability such inventions that aid in the protection of 
public health.85 Further, paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration interprets “a 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” as stated in 
article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, to be a public health crisis relating to 
“HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”86 Furthermore, the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health87 makes provision for allowing member countries to export a 
patented drug, which has been manufactured or imported under a compulsory 
license, to other countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for such 
drug.88  It would, therefore, not be anomalous to state that articles 30 and 31 of the 
 
83. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 
I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl 
_trips_e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
84.      TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 8. 
85.      Id. art. 27(2). 
86. Doha Declaration, supra note 83, ¶ 5(c). Paragraph 5(c), by necessary implication, also states that 
its interpretation of what can represent “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency” is not exhaustive or restricted to situations of public health crisis alone, in that “[e]ach 
member [country] has the right to determine what [generally can] constitute[] a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” in situations under article 31(b) of the 
TRIPS Agreement that are outside the purview of public health. See id.  
87. World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003), 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter 
Implementation Decision].  
88. See id. ¶ 6. The Implementation Decision creates an exception to article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which otherwise limits the authorized use of a patented invention to predominantly 
supplying the domestic market. See id. ¶ 6 read with ¶ 2. See also Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, 
Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
211, 213-14 (2004), (“Paragraph 6 [of the Implementation Decision] . . . by creating an exception to 
[a]rticle 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement . . . allows nations with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capabilities to override intellectual property protection and import generic copies of patented 
drugs to combat public health crisis.”). Further, the use of compulsory patent licensing in terms of 
the Implementation Decision is subject to certain obligations which both the importing member 
and the exporting member must meet. Such obligations include, among others, that the importing 
member must make a notification to the General Council in the following terms: (a) confirming 
that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the patented drug required to address its 
public health problem; (b) specifying the names and expected quantities of the patented drug it 
seeks to import in order to address its public health problem; and (c) that it has granted a 
compulsory license for the patented drug it seeks to import. See Implementation Decision, supra 
note 87, ¶ 2(a)(i)-(iii). In similar vein, the exporting member’s obligations include, among others, 
the following: (a) to specify the quantum of the generic copies of the patented drug that it would 
manufacture and export under the compulsory license; (b) to specially label or mark such copies of 
the drug; and (c) to notify, by way of a posting on its website or by any other means of publication, 
any information about the export of such copies of the patented drug. See id. ¶ 2(b)(i)-(iii).  
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TRIPS Agreement, when read with articles 8 and 27 therein, and when further 
read with paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration and paragraph 6 of the 
Implementation Decision, have the effect of creating a binding bridge between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the concept of public health.89 
B. Enforcement of Compulsory Licensing of Patented Drugs under 
the Patents Act of 1970 
1. Grounds for Issuing a Compulsory Patent License 
 An application seeking a compulsory license for a patented drug must first be 
filed at the Office of the Controller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks 
(hereinafter “Controller of Patents”), who is the statutory authority of first instance 
for the adjudication of proceedings pertaining to compulsory licensing in India.90 
Further, applicants seeking a compulsory patent license under the framework of 
the Patents Act of 1970 are typically India’s domestic pharmaceutical corporations, 
primarily engaged in the manufacturing of generic drugs, though an application 
for a compulsory patent license can also be filed by the Central (federal) 
Government of India.91 
 The various grounds on which a compulsory license for a patented drug may be 
granted are encapsulated in Chapter XVI, sections 82 through 94, of the Patents 
Act of 1970.92  Broadly speaking, there are four such grounds: first, to prevent the 
abuse of patent rights;93 second, to work a related patent;94 third, to address cases 
 
89. See Chien, supra note 21, at 870-71 (“While [a]rticles 30 and 31 apply to patents in all fields, 
[a]rticles 8 and 27, as well as the Doha Declaration . . ., explicitly address the relationship 
between TRIPS and public health.”).  
90.     The Office of the Controller of Patents, a subordinate office under the Department of Industrial 
Policy and Promotion of the Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry, administers laws and 
regulations relating to intellectual property rights in India. See  Shamnad Basheer, “Policy Style” 
Reasoning at the Indian Patent Office, 3 INTELL. PROP.Q., 309, 319 (2005). See also Mueller, supra 
note 12, at 615 (“The Controller [of Patents] has broad powers in deciding whether and on what 
terms to grant applications for compulsory licenses . . . . [I]n . . . [compulsory licensing] proceedings 
before him under the Patents Act [of 1970,] the Controller [of Patents] has certain powers of a civil 
court, including the power to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and to examine 
that person under oath, and to require the discovery and production of documents.”). 
91.     See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 2(1)(s) (stating that a “person”, seeking a compulsory pa-
tent license under the Patents Act of 1970, “includes the Government”). See also The Patents 
Rules, 2003, rule 96 (updated 2015), (specifying the procedural requirements for drafting a com-
pulsory patent license application filed by the Central Government in India) [hereinafter Patents 
Rules of 2003]. 
92.  See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §§ 82-94. For a quick reference of the precise grounds on 
which a compulsory license may be granted under the Patents Act of 1970, see infra Annexure 
I.A. 
93. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(1). 
94. Id. § 91(1). 
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of national emergency or extreme urgency, or for purposes of a public non-
commercial use;95 and fourth, to export a pharmaceutical patent to a country with 
no or insufficient manufacturing capacity.96  These grounds are discussed in depth 
in the paragraphs below. 
 a.  To prevent the abuse of patent rights (Section 84): 
Section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970 enumerates three specific instances of 
abuse of pharmaceutical patent rights: first, that the reasonable requirements of 
the public with respect to the patented drug have not been satisfied;97 second, that 
the patented drug is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price,98 
and third, that the patented drug is not worked in the territory of India.99  
Section 84(1)(a), when read with sections 84(4) and 84(7), enumerates the 
various circumstances where the reasonable requirements of the public with 
respect to a patented drug shall be deemed not to have been satisfied.100  For 
instance, “the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have 
been satisfied” if, on account of the refusal to grant a compulsory license, “an 
existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment of any 
new trade or industry in India . . . is prejudiced,”101 or “the demand for the 
patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms,”102 
or “a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being 
supplied or developed,”103 or “the establishment or development of commercial 
activities in India is prejudiced.”104  The reasonable requirements of the public 
shall further be deemed not to have been satisfied “if, by reason of conditions 
imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licenses under the patent or upon the 
purchase, hire or use of the patented article or process,  . . . the establishment or 
development of any trade or industry in India, is prejudiced,”105 or “if the patentee 
imposes a condition upon the grant of licenses under the patent to provide 
exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of [the] patent or 
coercive package licensing.”106  Furthermore, the reasonable requirements of the 
 
95. Id. § 92(1). 
96. Id. § 92A(1). 
97. See id. § 84(1)(a). 
98. See id. § 84(1)(b). 
99.    See id. § 84(1)(c). 
100. See id. § 84(7)(a)-(e). 
101. Id. § 84(7)(a)(i). 
102. Id. § 84(7)(a)(ii). 
103. Id. § 84 (7)(a)(iii). 
104. Id. § 84 (7)(a)(iv). 
105.    Id. § 84 (7)(b). 
106. Id. § 84 (7)(c). 
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public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied if a patented article is not being 
worked in India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent or to its fullest extent 
that is reasonably practicable,107 or if the working of the patented drug on a 
commercial scale in India is being hindered by the importation of the patented 
article from abroad by the patentee or his agents, or by persons directly indirectly 
purchasing from the patentee, or by third parties against whom the patentee has 
not enforced the patent.108   
According to section 84(1)(b), a compulsory license can also be obtained to 
prevent the abuse of a patented drug if such drug is not available to the public at a 
reasonably affordable price.109  Section 84 of the Patents Act of 1970 does not make 
specific the possible factors that the Controller of Patents must take into 
consideration while determining whether or not a patented drug is reasonably 
priced.110  Be that as it may, a generic drug manufacturer seeking a compulsory 
license under section 84(1)(b) of the Patents Act of 1970 has the burden to prima 
facie establish that the patented drug is not reasonably priced;111 for instance, by 
providing evidence of the drug prices charged by the patentee in India and then 
comparing those prices with the prices charged by the patentee for the same drug 
outside of India,112 or by comparing those prices with the prices of the drug’s non-
patented substitutes available in India.113 
According to section 84(1)(c), a compulsory license can be obtained to prevent 
the abuse of a patented drug if such drug has not been worked in India.114  
Although section 84(1)(c) does not define or explain what it means to “work a 
patent,” courts in India have broadly interpreted the “working of a patent in India” 
to mean that the patented invention is locally manufactured within the territory of 
India.115  It is noteworthy that while considering whether or not a patent has been 
 
107. Id. § 84 (7)(d). For the meaning of the expression “work a patent,” see infra note 115 and 
accompanying text. 
108. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(7)(e)(i)-(iii). Contra infra note 116 and accompanying 
text (highlighting the prevalent judicial trend that considers a patented article imported from 
abroad to have been worked in India, provided that the patentee can reasonably justify the 
circumstances which prevented him from manufacturing the patented article locally within 
India). 
109. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84 (1)(b). 
110. Mueller, supra note 12, at 592. 
111. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 87 (1). 
112. Mueller, supra note 12, at 593. 
113. Id. 
114. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84 (1)(c). 
115. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 1323 of 2013, July 15, 2014 (Bombay H.C.), at 48, 
available at http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/generatenewauth.php?auth=cGF0aD0uL2RhdGEvan 
VkZ2VtZW50cy8yMDE0LyZmbmFtZT1PU1dQMTEyODEzLnBkZiZzbWZsYWc9Tg== (“[W]hen a 
patent holder is faced with an application for [c]ompulsory [l]icense, it is for the patent holder to 
show that the patented invention / drug is worked in the territory of India by manufacture or 
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worked in India, the importation of such patent is also permissible, provided the 
patentee can reasonably explain and justify the circumstances that prevented him 
from manufacturing it locally within the country.116 
As part of the admissibility requirements, a compulsory patent license 
application under section 84 can be filed at any time after the expiration of three 
years from the date of the grant of the patent,117 and after the applicant has made 
efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions, 
and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period, not 
ordinarily exceeding six months.118 However, the requirement for a compulsory 
license applicant to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from 
a patentee is dispensed with “in case of national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial use or on establishment of 
a ground of anticompetitive practices adopted by the patentee.”119 Notably, the 
specific circumstances resulting in a waiver on the requirement of making initial 
efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license, as outlined in the proviso clause to   
section 84(6)(iv) of the Patents Act of 1970, are consistent with articles 31(b) and 
31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement.120   
 
otherwise.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Bayer v. Union of India (Decision of the Bombay High 
Court)]. 
116. Id. at 48-49 (“Manufactur[ing of a patent] . . . may not [always] be necessary to establish [the] 
working [of a patent] in India . . . .[W]here a patent holder satisfies the authorities, the reason 
why the patented invention could not be manufactured in India [sic] then the patented invention 
can be considered as having been worked in the territory in India even by import.”). Notably, the 
importation of a patent, as opposed to its local manufacturing in India, may not necessarily be a 
viable option for “working the patent” from both business and public health standpoint. See G.B. 
Reddy & Harunrashid A. Kadri, Local Working of Patents: Law and Implementation in India, 18 
J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 15, 22 (2013) (“Local production [of a patent] ensures price reduction, 
increases supply and competition and . . . increases domestic expertise in the production of 
medicines for key local diseases, increases transfer of technology and knowledge, increases 
employment, opens a new export market and improves foreign exchange flows.”). Nonetheless, the 
local manufacturing of a patent is also not always feasible, especially when its importation may be 
a better option towards “working the patent” in India. See id. at 23 (“In particular cases, [the] bulk 
production of patented goods from an existing plant and importing the goods to the country of 
patent grant may be more convenient for the patentee, rather than to establish a new industrial 
unit. It saves the start-up costs, manpower, maintenance cost, administrative expenses and other 
infrastructural expenses, including electricity, water, etc.”). Therefore, while deciding whether a 
patentee should be permitted to work his patent in India through its importation, a “case-to-case” 
basis approach is appropriate with each case being decided on its own merits. See Bayer Corp. v. 
Union of India (Decision of the Bombay High Court), supra note 115, at 48. 
117.    Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(1). 
118. Id. § 84(6)(iv) read with Explanation Clause to § 84(6)(iv)(stating that “reasonable period” in 
section 84(6)(iv) “shall be construed as a period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months”). 
119. Id. Proviso Clause to § 84(6)(iv). 
120. See discussion supra Part III.A (enumerating the specific circumstances stated in articles 31(b) 
and 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement, which obviate a compulsory license applicant from making 
initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee). 
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Once a compulsory patent license application under section 84 is admitted and 
published in the official journal by the Controller of Patents, the patentee is duly 
notified with a copy of such application, and is provided with a reasonable 
opportunity to file his opposition to such application in terms of the procedure laid 
down in section 87 of the Patents Act of 1970.121 Further, once the compulsory 
license applicant is notified of the patentee’s opposition to his application, and only 
after both the applicant and the patentee have been afforded an opportunity to be 
heard, that the Controller of Patents decides whether the compulsory license 
should be denied or granted.122  
 b.  To work a related patent (Section 91): 
Section 91 of the Patents Act of 1970 provides that “any person who has the 
right to work any other patented invention either as patentee or as licensee 
thereof, . . . may apply . . . [for a compulsory license in respect of an already 
existing patent] on the ground that he is prevented or hindered without such 
license from working the other invention efficiently or to the best advantage 
possible.”123  This ground for issuing a compulsory license is invoked to “alleviate 
the situation of blocking of patents,” wherein a related (second) patent cannot be 
worked without infringing another’s already-existing (first) patent.124 
An application filed under section 91 for a compulsory license to work a related 
patent must meet the following two pre-conditions: first, that the applicant agrees 
to grant to the (first) patentee a “cross-license” of the related (second) patent under 
reasonable terms,125 and second, that the applicant’s patented invention (second 
patent) has made a “substantial contribution to the establishment or development 
of commercial or industrial activities” in India.126  Once both pre-conditions have 
been met, the Controller of Patents may, at his discretion, grant a compulsory 
license for the first patent, and also grant a cross-license for the related (second) 
 
121.    Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §§ 87(1)-87(2). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, 
rule 98(1) (providing that the patentee shall file his notice of opposition within two months from 
the date on which the compulsory license application filed under section 84 is published in the offi-
cial journal). 
122.    Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 87(4). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, rule 
98(5) (providing that the Controller of Patents shall give the licensee and the patentee no less 
than ten days’ notice of hearing on a compulsory license application filed under section 84). 
123. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 91(1). 
124. Mueller, supra note 12, at 605. 
125.    See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 91(2)(i). See also Mueller, supra note 12, at 605 (using 
the term “cross-license” in relation to the license granted to the (first) patentee to use the second 
(related) patent owned by a compulsory license applicant under section 91 of the Patents Act of 
1970).  
126. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 91(2)(ii). 
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patent, if such cross-license is requested by the first patentee.127  It is noteworthy 
that both these pre-conditions, as stipulated in section 91(2) of the Patents Act of 
1970, as well as the manner in which the Controller of Patents adjudicates upon 
these pre-conditions under section 91(3) therein, are consistent with article 31(l)(i)-
(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement.128  Notably, while an application seeking a 
compulsory patent license under section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970 can be 
filed only after three years have expired from the date of the grant of the patent,129 
section 91(1) does not create any such window period as it allows a compulsory 
license application seeking to work a related (second) patent to be filed at any time 
after the grant of the (first) patent.130  Further, while sections 84 and 91 may be at 
variance with one another insofar as the window period for filing a compulsory 
patent license application is concerned, both of these provisions find a common 
ground in section 87 of the Patents Act of 1970.  That is to say, the same 
procedural mechanism laid down under section 87, which affords the patentee with 
the opportunity to oppose compulsory license applications filed under section 84,131 
is also followed in the case of compulsory license applications filed under section 
91.132 
 
 c.  To address cases of national emergency or extreme urgency, or for 
purposes of a public non-commercial use (Section 92): 
Section 92 of the Patents Act of 1970 provides that at any time after the grant of 
a patent for a drug, if the Central (federal) Government in India officially declares 
by way of a gazette notification that such patented drug is necessary to address a 
circumstance of national emergency or an extreme urgency, or for purposes of 
public non-commercial use, including a public health crisis relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria, or other epidemics, the Controller of Patents shall, on an 
 
127.    See id. § 91(3). See also id. Proviso Clause to § 91(3) (“[T]he license granted by the Controller [of 
Patents] shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the respective patents.”). 
128. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also Mueller, supra note 12, at 606 n.653 
(explaining that such consistency between section 91(2) of the Patents Act of 1970 and article 31(l) 
of TRIPS Agreement “enable[s] innovators to adapt foreign inventions to local needs” (quoting 
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing United States 
Law and Practice with Options under the TRIPS Agreement, at 43, 46 (Paper presented to the 
AALS Mid-Year Workshop on Intellectual Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, June 14-16, 
2006)).  
129.   See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(1). 
130.   Id. § 91(1). 
131.   See id. § 84 read with id. § 87 (1)-(4). 
132.   Section 91(4) of the Patents Act of 1970 allows patentees to oppose compulsory license applications 
filed under section 91(1) by following the procedure laid out in section 87, which is the same 
procedure followed by patentees while opposing compulsory license applications filed under 
section 84. See id. § 91(4) read with id. § 87 (1)-(4). 
 Compulsory Patent Licensing in India, its Compliance with TRIPS, and Bayer v. Natco 
353 
application made at any time after the government’s official notification, grant a 
compulsory license for the patented drug,133 Notably, the grant of a compulsory 
license under section 92 of the Patents Act of 1970 is consistent with article 31(b) of 
the TRIPS Agreement read with paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration.134 
It may be relevant to note that section 92 is titled as “Special Provision for 
compulsory licenses on notifications by Central Government.”135 As explicit in this 
title, a government notification is the immediate precursor to filing an application 
seeking a compulsory license under section 92. Therefore, since the admissibility of 
an application filed under section 92 is singularly premised on a government 
notification declaring the need for a compulsory patent license to address a 
national emergency or an extreme urgency or for purposes of a public non-
commercial use, it can reasonably be inferred that the applicant filing such 
application is dispensed with the requirement of making initial efforts towards 
obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee.136 Notably, the waiver on the 
requirement to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license, implicit 
in section 92(1)(i) of the Patents Act of 1970, is consistent with the proviso clause to 
section 84(6)(iv) therein,137 and is further consistent with article 31(b) of the TRIPS 
Agreement.138  
Although section 92 generally affords a patentee with the opportunity to oppose 
an application seeking a compulsory license for his patented drug,139 the 
opportunity for such an opposition is waived if the Controller of Patents is 
convinced that a waiver is necessary to expedite the grant of the compulsory 
license for addressing a circumstance of national emergency or an extreme 
urgency, or a case of public non-commercial use, including a public health crisis 
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, or other epidemics.140  While waiving 
the patentee’s opportunity to oppose a compulsory license application filed under 
 
133.   See id. § 92(1)(i) read with § 92(3). 
134.   See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, when read with 
paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration, allows for the grant of a compulsory license to address a 
national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency, including a public health crisis relating 
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, or for purposes of a public non-
commercial use). 
135.   Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 92. 
136.   See id. § 92(1)(i).  
137.   Id. Proviso Clause to § 84(6)(iv) (stating that the requirement of a compulsory license applicant 
making initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee “shall not be appli-
cable in case of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public 
non-commercial use . . .”). 
138.   See discussion supra Part III.A (enumerating the specific circumstances stated in article 31(b) of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which obviate a compulsory license applicant from making initial efforts 
towards obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee). 
139. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 92(2) read with §§ 87(1)-87(2). 
140.   See id. § 92(3). 
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section 92, the Controller of Patents  should inform the patentee, “as soon as may 
be practicable,” of such waiver.”141 Further, while fixing the terms and conditions 
of a compulsory license granted under section 92, the Controller of Patents shall 
ensure that generic copies of the patented drug are “available to the public at the 
lowest prices consistent with the patentees [sic] deriving a reasonable advantage 
from their patent rights.142 
 d.  To export a pharmaceutical patent to a country with insufficient 
or no manufacturing capacity (Section 92A): 
Section 92A was incorporated into the Patents Act of 1970 in the year 2005143 to 
bring it in sync with paragraph 6 of the Implementation Decision that allows 
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities to import generic copies 
of patented drugs in the event of a public health crisis.144 Following the text of 
paragraph 6 of the Implementation Decision, section 92A of the Patents Act of 
1970 makes provision for the grant of a compulsory license for a patented drug, 
solely for manufacturing and exporting generic copies of such drug,145 to address 
the public health problems of any country having insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacity for the patented drug.146  
As a procedural requirement, a compulsory license application for a patented 
drug filed under section 92A may be allowed only if the country to which the export 
is being made has also granted a compulsory license for such drug, or has, by 
notification or otherwise, allowed the importation of such drug from India.147  
However, section 92A is silent on the precise quantum of the generic copies of a 
patented drug that a licensee is permitted to export through the means of a 
compulsory license granted under section 92, which thus brings it at variance with 
paragraph 2 of the Implementation Decision.148 
It is noteworthy that section 92A is silent on whether a patentee must be 
afforded the opportunity to oppose a compulsory license application filed under this 
 
141.    Id. Proviso Clause to § 92(3). 
142.   See id. § 92(1)(ii).  
143. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
144. See Implementation Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 6. 
145. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 92A(2). 
146. Id. § 92A(1).  
147. Id.  
148. Compare Implementation Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 2, with Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 
92A. See also supra note 88 and accompanying text (outlining the obligations imposed on both the 
importing member as well as the exporting member, in terms of paragraph 2 of the 
Implementation Decision, which include, among others, a mutual obligation vested in both 
members to specify the names and expected quantities of the patented drug that the exporting 
member, by means of a compulsory license, needs to manufacture and export to the importing 
member with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for such drug). 
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provision, or otherwise be heard on the matter.149  The lack of such procedural 
mechanism, consequently, vests the Controller of Patents with a “virtually 
unfettered” discretion while deciding a section 92A compulsory license 
application,150 thus bringing section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970 at variance 
with the other provisions therein, viz. sections 84, 91 and 92, which allow the 
patentee with an opportunity to oppose a compulsory license application.151   
2. Terms and Conditions of a Compulsory Patent License 
Just like in any standard contract, the issuance of a compulsory license for a 
patented drug is subject to terms and conditions that are settled by the Controller 
of Patents at the time of granting the compulsory patent license.152  These terms 
and conditions, as stipulated in section 90(1) of the Patents Act of 1970, include, 
inter alia, (i) that the licensee pays a reasonable sum of royalty and other 
remuneration to the patentee,153 (ii) that the patented drug is worked to the fullest 
extent by the licensee and with a reasonable profit to him,154 (iii) that the licensee 
sells the patented drug for which the license is granted at a reasonably affordable 
price,155 (iv) that the compulsory license is non-exclusive,156 (v) that  the 
compulsory license is non-assignable,157 and (vi) that the compulsory license is for 
the balance term of the patented drug, “unless a shorter term is consistent with 
 
149. Mueller, supra note 12, at 602. 
150. Id. at 601. 
151. See id. at 602. 
152. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 read with § 93 (“Any order for the grant of a 
(compulsory) license shall operate as if it were a deed granting a license executed by the patentee 
and all other necessary parties embodying the terms and conditions, if any, settled by the 
Controller.”). For a quick reference of the precise terms and conditions under which a compulsory 
patent license may be granted by the Controller of Patents under the Patents Act of 1970, see 
infra Annexure I.B. 
153. While determining the quantum of “royalty and other remuneration” payable to the patentee, the 
Controller of Patents takes into consideration various relevant factors, viz. the nature of the 
patented drug, the expenditure incurred by the patentee in manufacturing or developing the drug, 
and the expenditure incurred by the patentee in obtaining a patent on the drug and for keeping 
such patent in force. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 (1)(i). 
154. See id. § 90 (1)(ii). 
155. See id. § 90 (1)(iii). 
156. Id. § 90 (1)(iv). See also Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer 
to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 227, 248-49 (Keith M. Maskus & Jerome 
H. Reichman eds., 2005) (explaining the term “non-exclusive” to mean that “the patent owner can 
continue to exploit . . . [his] invention and directly compete with the compulsory licensee, 
leveraging the advantages conferred by technical knowledge and the prestige of brand names”). 
157. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 (1)(v). See also Correa, supra note 156, at 249 (explaining 
the term “non-assignable” to mean that “[t]he patent owner . . .  retains the right to grant any 
voluntary licenses he wishes”). 
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public interest.”158  Further, although a compulsory license for a patented drug is 
granted with the predominant purpose of supplying to the domestic market in 
India,159 section 90(1) stipulates that generic copies of such drug may be allowed to 
be manufactured and exported to foreign markets under any of the following two 
circumstances: first, if the “market for export of the patented [drug] manufactured 
in India is not being supplied or developed;”160 or second, if “the [compulsory]  
license is granted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative 
process to be anti-competitive.161 Section 90(2) further stipulates that a compulsory 
license for a patented drug, upon being granted by the Controller of Patents, “shall 
[not] authorize the licensee to import the patented [drug] . . . or . . . [a drug] made 
by a patented process from abroad where such importation would, but for such 
authorization, constitute an infringement of the rights of the patentee.”162 That is 
to say, the grant of a compulsory license for a patented drug shall not authorize the 
licensee to import generic copies of the patented drug from a country that does not 
have a compulsory license authorizing the export of generic copies of such drug.163 
However, the Central (federal) Government may, where it is of the opinion that 
public interest demands, direct the Controller of Patents to authorize the licensee 
of a compulsory license, to import generic copies of a patented drug, regardless of 
whether the country from which such import is being made has a compulsory 
license authorizing the export of generic copies of such drug.164 
Notably, while section 90(1) sets out the terms and conditions that must be 
settled by the Controller of Patents specifically for granting a compulsory license to 
prevent abuse of patent rights (under section 84),165 the same terms and conditions 
also apply when a compulsory license is granted to work a related patent (under 
section 91),166 and when a compulsory patent license is granted to address cases of 
national emergency or extreme urgency, or for purposes of a public non-commercial 
use (under section 92).167  It is, however, not clear if the terms and conditions of a 
 
158. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 (1)(vi). 
159. See id. § 90(1)(vii). 
160. See id. § 90(1)(vii) read with § 84(7)(a)(iii). Further, unlike section 90(1)(vii) read with section 
84(7)(a)(iii) of the Patents Act of 1970, there is no analogous provisions in Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement that authorize generic drug manufacturers to export patented drugs in the event that 
the domestic markets for the export of such drugs is not being developed. Compare TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 50, art. 31 (a)-(l), with Patents Act, 1970, supra note 39, § 90(1)(vii) read 
with § 84(7)(a)(iii). 
161. Id. § 90(1)(ix). 
162.    See id. § 90(2). 
163.    See id. 
164.    See id. 90(3). 
165. Id. § 90(1). 
166. Id. § 91 (4).  
167. Id. § 92 (2). Additionally, when a compulsory license is granted in circumstances of national 
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compulsory patent license, as set out in section 90(1), would apply when the 
Controller of Patents grants a compulsory license for a patented drug to enable 
generic copies of such drug to be manufactured and exported to countries with 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the patented drug (under section 
92A).168 Be that as it may, by making provision for compulsory patent licensing to 
enable generic copies of a patented drug to be manufactured and exported to 
foreign markets outside of India, section 92A effectively creates an exception to 
section 90(1), which otherwise limits the use of a compulsory license for 
predominantly supplying to the domestic market in India.169 
It may be relevant to note that the terms and conditions of a compulsory license 
for a patented drug, once settled by the Controller of Applicants at the time of the 
grant of such license, are subject to a one-time revision under section 88(4) of the 
Patents Act of 1970.170 As a procedural requirement, the licensee (holder of the 
compulsory license), seeking the revision of the terms and conditions of a 
compulsory license granted to him for a patented drug, should make an application 
for revision to the Controller of Patents, provided that such application is made at 
any time after the licensee has commercially worked the drug for at least twelve 
months, and on the ground that terms and conditions initially settled have proved 
to be so onerous that the he is unable to work the drug except at a loss.171 
It may further be relevant to note that the Patents Act of 1970 does not 
explicitly provide any statutory remedies, viz. damages, specific performance, etc., 
that may be available if and when the terms and conditions of a compulsory patent 
license, as settled by the Controller of Patents at the time of its initial grant, are 
breached or frustrated by either contracting party (the licensee or the patentee) to 
such license. Notwithstanding the absence of specific provisions for remedying the 
breach of a compulsory patent license, the Controller of Patents may, upon an 
application made by a patentee or any person deriving title or interest in a patent, 
terminate a compulsory patent license issued for the patent, “if and when the 
 
emergency, extreme urgency, or for purposes of a public non-commercial use, the licensee shall 
make the patented drug available to the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentee 
deriving a reasonable advantage from his patent rights. Id. § 92 (1)(ii).  
168.   Section 92A is silent on whether a compulsory license granted under its provisions is subject to the 
same terms and conditions, as set out in section 90, that apply to compulsory licenses granted un-
der sections 84, 91 and 92, respectively, of the Patents Act of 1970. Id. § 92A. 
169.   See id. § 92A read with §§ 90(1)(vii),(ix). 
170.   See id. Proviso Clause to § 88(4).  
171. See id. § 88(4). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, rule 101(1)-(4) (providing that a 
licensee (holder of  a compulsory license), whose application for a revision of the terms and 
conditions of the compulsory license has been admitted by the Controller of Patents for 
adjudication, shall serve a copy of such application to the patentee, who may file his notice of 
opposition to such application within one month from the date of such service, and also serve a 
copy of his notice of opposition to the licensee). 
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circumstances that give rise to the grant [of such license] no longer exist and such 
circumstances are unlikely to recur.”172 While deciding an application for the 
termination of a compulsory patent license, the Controller of Patents shall ensure 
that the licensee (holder of the compulsory license) is afforded the right to object to 
such termination,173 and shall also take into account that such licensee’s interest is 
not unduly prejudiced.174 Notably, the circumstances under which an application 
seeking the termination of a compulsory patent license may be allowed, as outlined 
in section 94(1) the Patents Act of 1970, are consistent with the circumstances 
outlined in article 31(g) of the TRIPS Agreement.175  
The legal validity of an order denying or granting a compulsory license for a 
patented drug, including the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of such 
license as settled by the Controller of Patents, may be challenged before the 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) by way of an appeal,176 provided such 
appeal is made within three months from the date on which the compulsory license 
order is issued by the Controller of Patents, or within such further time as the 
IPAB, in its discretion, may allow,177 subject to being “satisfied. . . that there . . . 
 
172. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 94(1).  
173.    See id. Proviso Clause to § 94(1). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, rule 102(2)-(3) 
(providing that an applicant seeking the termination of a compulsory license shall serve a copy of 
such application to the licensee (holder of the compulsory license), who may file his objection to 
the application for termination within one month from the date of receipt of such application by 
him, and also serve a copy of his objection to the applicant). 
174.   Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 94(2). 
175.   See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that article 31(g) of the TRIPS Agreement allows the ter-
mination of a compulsory patent “if and when the circumstances which led to  . . . [the issuance of 
such license]cease to exist and are unlikely to recur”).  
176.   See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 117A(2). Section 117A(2), while  categorically stating that 
an appeal shall lie to the IPAB against a compulsory license order issued under section 84 (to pre-
vent the abuse of patent rights), or under section 91 (to work a related patent), or under section 92 
(to address circumstances of national emergency or extreme urgency, or a case of public non-
commercial use), does not mention whether an appeal shall also lie against any such order under 
issued section 92A (to permit the manufacturing and export of generic copies of a patented drug to 
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for such drug). This being the case, it can 
reasonably be inferred that compulsory license orders issued by the Controller of Patents under 
section 92A are final and non-appealable under the purview of the Patents Act of 1970. See id. 
Further, the use of the expression “any decision, order of the Controller of Patents” in section 
117A(2), by necessary implication, allows an applicant, who is otherwise successful in obtaining a 
compulsory license, to appeal against any terms and conditions of the license, viz. a high quantum 
of royalty fixed by the Controller of Patents, etc., that may appear unfair or onerous to him while 
executing the compulsory license order at a reasonable profit. See id. Moreover, as an alternative 
to filing an appeal, such applicant who is successful in obtaining a compulsory license for a pa-
tented invention, may exercise the option of subjecting the terms and conditions of the license to a 
one-time revision by filing an application for revision to the Controller of Patents, provided that 
such application is filed at any time after the applicant has commercially worked the drug for at 
least twelve months, and on the ground that terms and conditions initially settled have proved to 
be so onerous that the he is unable to work the drug except at a loss. Id. § 88(4). 
177.   Id. § 117A(4). 
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[was] sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time.”178 
The decision of the IPAB, though final under the Patents Act of 1970,179 is subject 
to judicial review under the Constitution of India.180 Notably, the provisions for 
challenging a compulsory license order issued by the Controller of Patents—both 
by way of an appeal to the IPAB under section 117A(2) of the Patents Act of 1970, 
as well as by way of judicial review under the Constitution of India—are consistent 
with articles 31(i) and 31(j) of the TRIPS Agreement.181  
 
IV.  Bayer v. Natco and its Reverberations: A Cult Classic of the 
Big Daddy, the Underdog, the Mother Hen, and the 
Scapegoats of Compulsory Patent Licensing in India 
  A. The Underdog Challenges the Status Quo: Procedural History of 
Natco’s Compulsory License Application  
Sorafenib Tosylate, the chemical name of a drug used in the treatment of 
advanced hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC)182, advanced renal cell carcinoma 
(RCC)183 and differentiated thyroid carcinoma (DTC),184 was invented by Bayer 
HealthCare Pharmaceuticals (hereinafter “Bayer”) and Onyx Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. (hereinafter “Onyx”) under mutual collaboration and co-promotion 
 
178.    The Patents (Appeals and Applications to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Rules, 2011, 
rule 3 (2011), notified in THE GAZETTE OF INDIA: EXTRAORDINARY, NOTIFICATION GSR NUMBER 
209(E) 8, PART II-§ 3(i) (Mar. 11, 2011). 
  179.    There is no provision for further appeal against a decision rendered by the IPAB under the          
Patents Act of 1970. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 117B.  
180. The constitutional validity of a decision rendered by the IPAB under the Patents Act of 1970 can 
be challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the state High Courts under article 226 of the 
Constitution of India. See INDIA CONST. (1950) art. 226. In similar vein, the IPAB’s decision can 
also be challenged before the Supreme Court of India by invoking its writ jurisdiction under 
article 32 of the Constitution of India. See INDIA CONST. (1950) art. 32. See also Harshad Pathak, 
The Jurisdictional Dilemma Surrounding the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, 20 J. INTELL. 
PROP. RTS. 51, 54 (2015) (arguing that the exercise of judicial review by the state high courts and 
the Supreme Court, acting under their respective writ jurisdiction, is part of the “basic structure” 
of Constitution of India, and therefore, a tribunal established under ordinary legislations, such as 
the IPAB, cannot exercise its quasi-judicial or appellate functions in a manner so as to exclude the 
writ jurisdiction of the state high courts and the Supreme Court of India).  
181.    See discussion supra  Part III.A (noting that article 31(i) of the TRIPS Agreement, when read with 
article 31(j) therein, states that “the decision of the competent authority, allowing or dismissing 
the authorization of such use, including its decision on the quantum of remuneration payable to 
the patentee, shall not be final but subject to judicial review by a higher authority”). 
182.    HCC, at its advanced stages, is a type of liver cancer that cannot be treated with surgery. 
 NEXAVAR®, http://www.nexavar-us.com/what-is-nexavar/?p=liver/ (select “What is NEXAVAR?” 
hyperlink) (last visited June 30, 2015). 
183.    RCC, at its advanced stages, is a type of kidney cancer that cannot be treated with surgery. Id. 
184. DTC is a type of progressing thyroid cancer that can no longer be treated with radioactive iodine.   
Id. 
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agreements.185  Bayer obtained the patent on Sorafenib Tosylate in India in 2008, 
and since then has been marketing the drug within the country under its 
worldwide brand name “Nexavar®.”186  Bayer has been selling the drug in India at 
US $5,608 per month’s dose,187 which must be taken by the patient on a preventive 
basis throughout his lifetime to increase his life expectancy.188   
Finding Nexavar to be exorbitantly priced for the average Indian consumer but 
therapeutically indispensable as a life-extending drug, Natco Pharma Ltd. 
(hereinafter “Natco”), a leading Indian pharmaceutical company, approached 
Bayer in 2010 for a voluntary license to manufacture and sell the drug in India.189  
Though its negotiations with Bayer did not materialize, Natco was successful in 
obtaining a regulatory approval in April 2011 from the Drug Controller General of 
India for marketing the generic version of Nexavar in the country.190   
 
185. Therapies: Nexavar (Sorafenib) Tablets, ONYX PHARM., http://www.onyx.com/therapies/ nexavar-
sorafenib-tablets (section titled “Partner Status”) (last visited June 30, 2015) (“Onyx and Bayer 
each fund 50 percent of the development costs for Nexavar worldwide, excluding Japan, where 
Bayer funds all product development. Onyx and Bayer co-promote Nexavar in the U.S. and share 
equally in any profits or losses. Outside of the U.S., Bayer has exclusive marketing rights and 
Onyx and Bayer share profits 50/50 globally, excluding Japan, where Bayer paid Onyx a one-time 
payment of $160 million in 2011, as part of its expanded collaboration agreement.”).  
186. Bayer filed its patent application for Nexavar in the United States on January 13, 1999, and 
followed it by filing its PCT International Application, bearing PCT/US00/000648, on January 12, 
2000. On July 5, 2001, Bayer’s PCT application entered the national phase of registration in 
India. Bayer received all requisite regulatory approvals for importing and marketing Nexavar in 
India by January 2008, and finally a patent no. 215758 was granted to it on March 3, 2008.  For a 
chronological overview of when and how Bayer obtained the patent on Nexavar, first in the 
United States and thereafter in India, see Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. 1 of 
2011, Mar. 9, 2012 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai), pp 4-5 available at 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_ License_12032012.pdf (India.) [hereinafter, Natco 
v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents)]. See also Varun Chhonkar, Nexavar: Compulsory 
License Will Severely Impact Global Pharma Companies, PATENT CIRCLE (Aug. 10, 2011, 12:23 
PM), http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2011/08 /nexavar-compulsory-license-will.html (last visited 
June 30, 2015) (noting that there were no “pre-grant oppositions" filed against Bayer’s patent 
application for Nexavar, and  grant of the patent was published on March 28, 2008, which was 
followed by a “one year window period for post-grant opposition” that ended on March 28, 2009).  
187.    SAVITA GAUTAM & MEGHNA DASGUPTA, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE 
PACIFIC, COMPULSORY LICENSING: INDIA’S MAIDEN EXPERIENCE 8 (ARTNeT Working Paper 
Series, No. 137, Nov. 2013, Bangkok), available at artnet.unescap.org/pub/wp13713.pdf. 
188. See Naval Satarawala Chopra & Dinoo Muthappa, The Curious Case of Compulsory Licensing in 
India,8 COMPETITION L. INT’L  ¶ 5 (2012), available at http://awa2013.concurrences.com/business-
articles-awards/article/the-curious-case-of-compulsory (stating that “Nexavar is a life-enhancing 
and not a life-saving drug . . . ”). See also Josep M. Llovet et al., Sorafenib in Advanced 
Hepatocellular Carcinoma, 4 N. ENGL. J. MED. 378, 378-83 (2008), available at (documenting a 
study conducted on 602 people suffering from inoperable liver cancer, wherein it was found that 
patients who received sorafenib, also known as Nexavar, lived forty-four per cent longer than 
those who did not receive Nexavar). 
189. See Natco v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents), supra note 186, at 6 (documenting that 
Natco had “proposed to sell the drug at a price of Rs. 8800/- for one month therapy” as compared 
to Bayer’s price of about Rs. 2,80,428/-). 
190.    Id. at 5. 
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In order to thwart the launching of the generic version of Nexavar in India, 
Bayer arraigned Natco in a suit for patent infringement, which it filed in the High 
Court of Delhi on June 5, 2011.191  As a counter-attack, Natco not only decided to 
defend the patent infringement suit,192 but it went a step forward and filed an 
application before the Controller of Patents in Bombay on July 28, 2011, seeking a 
compulsory license to manufacture and market the generic version of Nexavar in 
India under section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970.193  Notably, notwithstanding 
the pendency of Bayer’s patent infringement suit before the High Court of Delhi, 
the Controller of Patents, by his order dated August 8, 2011, admitted Natco’s 
compulsory license application for processing.194  
Aggrieved, Bayer petitioned before the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi, 
respectively, alleging that Natco’s compulsory license application had been 
erroneously admitted by the Controller of Patents on a mere prima facie view of 
the matter.195  This admissibility issue, however, was rejected first by the High 
Court of Bombay, by its order dated November 11, 2011,196 and subsequently by 
the High Court of Delhi, by its order dated November 16, 2011,197 thereby forcing 
Bayer to withdraw its petitions from both the courts.   
Having failed to prevent the processing of Natco’s compulsory license 
application, Bayer was left with no choice but to contest the compulsory license 
proceedings before the Controller of Patents.  Bayer, thus, opposed Natco’s 
application for a compulsory license on, inter alia, two key grounds: first, that 
Natco did not take adequate steps to obtain a voluntary license from Bayer in 
respect of Nexavar in terms of section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970,198 and 
second, that although Nexavar was not being locally manufactured in India, Bayer 
 
191. Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., C.S. (O.S.) No. 1090/2011 (Delhi H.C.), available at 
http://www.delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=577484 [hereinafter, Bayer v. 
Natco (Patent Infringement Suite Before the Delhi High Court)]. As of June 30, 2015, this case 
continues to be pending and all interlocutory orders passed so far in this matter can be referenced 
via the official website of the High Court of Delhi. 
192.    The various interlocutory orders passed so far in Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., id., indicate 
that Natco has been defending the patent infringement suit filed by Bayer since June 2011. 
193. For accessing the officially published draft of Natco’s compulsory license application filed before 
the Controller of Patents in Mumbai, see OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE at pp. 13344-
63 (Publication of the Patent Office, Issue No. 32/2011, Aug. 12, 2011), available at 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxzcGljeWlwZmlsZ
XN8Z3g6NDFlNjAxZDIyOTY0MjMyMg. 
194.    Natco v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents), supra note 186, at 6-7. 
195. Id. at 7. 
196. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2011) W.P. No. 2194/2011, ¶ 4 (Bombay H.C.), available at 
http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/adjournlist1.php. 
197. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2011) W.P.(C) No. 8062/2011, ¶ 2 (Delhi H.C.), available at 
http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=600210. 
198.    Natco v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents), supra note 186, at 9. 
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had “worked” the drug on a commercial scale in the country by importing it from 
contract manufacturers abroad.199  However, the Controller of Patents did not find 
merit in Bayer’s opposition, reasoning that “mere importation cannot amount to 
working of a patented invention.”200  Interpreting the expression “worked in the 
territory of India,” as stated in section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act of 1970, to mean 
“manufactured to a reasonable extent in India,”201 the Controller of Patents further 
observed that Bayer had failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why it 
had failed to set up local manufacturing facilities for developing Nexavar in India 
despite having held an Indian patent on the drug since 2008.202   
Finally, accepting Natco’s contention that the reasonable requirements of the 
public in India with respect to Nexavar had not been met203, and further, that the 
drug had not been marketed in the country at a reasonably affordable price,204 the 
Controller of Patents allowed the compulsory license application, thereby directing 
Bayer to license the manufacturing of Nexavar to Natco for a royalty of 6% of the 
 
199. Id. at pp. 38-39.  
200. Id. at 43. 
201. Id. at 43 -44 (“[A] combined reading of Section[s] 83(c) and (f) … [of the Patents Act, 1970] …” 
makes it clear that “a patentee is obliged to contribute towards the transfer and dissemination of 
technology … so as to balance the rights with the obligations. A patentee can achieve this by 
either manufacturing the product in India or by granting a license to any other person for 
manufacturing in India.”). It is further noteworthy that the Controller of Patents read articles 
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement together with articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention to 
rationalize the legislative intent behind having “failure to work the patent” as a ground for 
issuing compulsory license under section 84(1) (c) of the Patents Act of 1970. Id. at 41-42 (“When 
the Article 27(1) of TRIPS Agreement is read with …. [articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2)] of the Paris 
Convention, it follows that importation of a patented invention shall not result in forfeiture of a 
patent. However, a reasonable fetter on the patent rights in the form of a compulsory license is 
very well within the purview of the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement, when there is an 
abuse of patent rights. It is this flexibility … [that has resulted in] the Parliament … 
incorporating a provision [section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act, 1970] for grant of compulsory license 
upon [a patentee’s] failure to work the invention within the territory of India.”). 
202. See id. at 45. 
203. Id. at 20-24. During the course of the compulsory license proceedings, Bayer submitted before the 
Controller of Patents that it had sold 593 boxes of Nexavar during 2011, though there was a 
requirement of 2,700 boxes that year to cater to around 8,842 patients requiring the drug in India. 
Based on these figures, the Controller estimated that Bayer did not supply Nexavar® to more 
than 200 patients during 2011, which was only a little above 2% of the eligible patients, thereby 
concluding that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the drug had not been 
met in India in terms of §84(1)(a) of the Patents Act of 1970. Id. at 22. 
204. Id. at 24-36. During the course of the compulsory license proceedings, Bayer argued that the 
expression “reasonably affordable price,” as stated in §84(1)(b) of the Patents Act of 1970, should 
be construed not just in terms of the purchasing power of the public, but primarily in terms of the 
cost incurred by the patentee on R&D. The Controller of Patents, however, rejected this 
argument, stating that the expression “reasonably affordable price” must be construed 
predominantly with reference to the public. Further, the fact that Bayer had not met the 
reasonable requirements of the Indian public with respect to Nexavar could be explained on 
account of the drug not being sold at a reasonably affordable price. Id. at 34-36. 
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net sales of the drug payable on a quarterly basis.205 
 B. The Big Daddy Strikes Back: Bayer’s Appeal before the IPAB 
Aggrieved by the decision of the Controller of Patents, Bayer appealed against 
the compulsory license order issued by the Controller of Patents before the IPAB.  
Pending the disposal of its appeal, Bayer filed an interlocutory petition for a 
temporary stay on the compulsory license, which was dismissed by the IPAB on 
September 14, 2012.206  On March 4, 2013, the IPAB dismissed Bayer’s appeal, 
thus upholding the compulsory license granted by the Controller of Patents to 
Natco for manufacturing and marketing the generic version of Nexavar in India.207 
Bayer attacked the compulsory order of the Controller of Patents before the 
IPAB by fielding a two-pronged appeal.  The first prong of Bayer’s appeal 
specifically alleged three procedural irregularities pertaining to the admissibility of 
the compulsory license application, asserting that the Controller of Patents erred 
in admitting the application.  First, Bayer claimed that it was not given notice and 
an opportunity to be heard as required by section 87(1) of the Patents Act of 
1970.208  Second, the Controller of Patents allegedly erred by accepting that Natco 
had undertaken the required reasonable steps under section 84(6)(iv) to seek a 
voluntary license from Bayer for manufacturing and marketing Nexavar in 
India.209  Third, Bayer claimed that the compulsory license application should have 
been rejected for want of documentary evidence corroborating Natco’s interest in 
being issued the compulsory license.210   
The second prong of Bayer’s appeal specifically raised five issues on the 
substance and merits of the impugned compulsory license order.  First, in 
ascertaining whether the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to 
Nexavar had been met in India, the Controller of Patents allegedly erred by failing 
to consider the supply of the generic version of the drug in the Indian market by 
another drug manufacturer, Cipla, as well as by Bayer’s self-sponsored Patient 
Assistance Programme (PAP).211  Second, Bayer asserted that in determining 
whether Nexavar was reasonably affordable to the general public in India, the 
 
205. Id. at 60-61. 
206. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, M.P. Nos. 74 to 76/2012 & 108/2012, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, 
Sept. 14, 2012 (IPAB, Chennai). 
207. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, Mar. 4, 2013 (IPAB, 
Chennai), available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf [hereinafter Bayer v. 
Natco (Decision of the IPAB, Chennai)]. 
208. Id. at 4. 
209. Id. at 7. 
210. See id. 4. 
211. Id. at 4-5. 
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Controller of Patents erred by failing to take into account the cost of R&D incurred 
by Bayer in manufacturing the drug.212  Third, given that Nexavar—a palliative 
drug with a relatively small patient base—required a longer time to make inroads 
into the Indian pharmaceutical market, Bayer alleged that it was unfairly denied 
adjournment or extension of time by the Controller of Patents to work the drug to 
its fullest extent in India.213  Fourth, Bayer asserted that contrary to the Controller 
of Patents’ holding, local manufacturing of Nexavar was not necessary for the drug 
to have been “worked in the territory of India” under section 84(1)(c) of the Patents 
Act of 1970.214  And fifth, Bayer contended that the Controller of Patents 
arbitrarily exercised his discretionary power, vested in him under section 90 of the 
Patents Act of 1970, by fixing the terms and conditions of the compulsory license, 
particularly with respect to the sum of royalty that Natco was directed to pay to 
Bayer.215  
C. The Mother Hen Prevails: Decision of the IPAB 
The IPAB, in a well-reasoned order dated March 4, 2013, dismissed Bayer’s 
appeal of the compulsory license order.216  In the first leg of its decision, the IPAB 
rejected Bayer’s challenge to the compulsory license order on procedural issues, 
reasoning that—first, as no final determination of rights could be contemplated at 
the initial stage of admitting Natco compulsory license application, the Controller 
of Patents was required to make only a prima facie consideration of the matter in 
terms of section 87(1) of the Patents Act of 1970, which further dispensed him with 
the obligation to provide Bayer any notice or an opportunity to be heard;217 second, 
a letter from Natco to Bayer dated December 6, 2010, and Bayer’s response dated 
December 27, 2010, appropriately suggested that Natco had made a genuine, 
though failed, effort at securing a voluntary license from Bayer as required by 
84(6)(iv);218 and third, given that the Controller of Patents had all necessary 
evidence on record before it decided the compulsory license application on its 
merits and that Bayer had been duly apprised of such evidence, it could not be said 
that Natco had lapsed in filing documentary evidence along with its application 
 
212. See id. at 8-9. 
213. See id. at 4. 
214. Id.   
215. See id.at 5. 
216. Id. 
217. See id. at 5-7. Moreover, given that Bayer participated in all proceedings subsequent to filing its 
opposition to the compulsory license application, ipso facto, estopped it from challenging the 
compulsory license order for want of notice or an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 5-6. 
218. Id. at 7-10. 
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under section 84(3) of the Patents Act of 1970.219  In the second leg of its decision, 
the IPAB rejected Bayer’s challenge to the merits of the compulsory license order, 
reasoning that—first, as Bayer had admittedly never licensed Cipla to 
manufacture the generic version of Nexavar, the latter’s sales of the drug on the 
Indian market could not be factored in to determine whether or not the reasonable 
requirements of the public had been met under section 84(1)(a);220 second, Bayer’s 
sale of the drug in India at US $5,500 per month’s dose could not be considered 
reasonably affordable to the public under section 84(1)(b);221 third, despite 
managing to secure a patent on Nexavar four years prior to the filing of the 
compulsory license application, the lack of promptitude on Bayer’s part in taking 
reasonable steps to work its patent in India provided a justified reason to the 
Controller of Patents to deny adjournment under section 86 of the Patents Act of 
1970;222 and fourth, though the expression “worked in the territory of India,” as 
stated in section 84(1)(c), could be satisfied solely by importing the patented 
invention, Bayer had failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why it could 
not locally manufacture Nexavar in India despite having held an Indian patent on 
the drug since 2008.223  Although Bayer lost its appeal of the compulsory license 
order on all counts, it managed to successfully convince the IPAB to increase the 
rate of royalty that had been fixed by the Controller of Patents by one per cent.224 
 
219. Id. at 11 (“[I]f there is any lapse [on Natco’s part in not filing any documentary evidence], it is a 
procedural lapse [and] on that ground, the order cannot be set aside.”). 
220. See id. at 17. See also Prashant Reddy, Bayer Sues Cipla for Infringement of its Nexavar 
Patent – C.S. (O.S.) No. 523 of 2010 before the High Court of Delhi, SPICY IP INDIA (Apr. 18, 
2010, 4:24 PM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/04/bayer-sues-cipla-for-infringement-
of.html (last visited May 30, 2013) (explaining that on March 23, 2010, Bayer filed a patent 
infringement suit against Cipla, (Bayer Corp. v. Cipla Ltd., C.S. (O.S.) No. 523/2010), which 
as of April 12, 2013, is pending final disposal before the High Court of Delhi). It is interesting 
that while Bayer has been fighting tooth and nail to restrain Cipla from manufacturing the 
generic version of Nexavar in India, it pleaded with the IPAB to consider Cipla’s sales of the 
drug as a relevant factor in ascertaining whether or not the reasonable requirements of public 
had been met in accordance with §84(1)(a) of the Patents Act of 1970. The IPAB, however, 
rejected this plea, reasoning that Bayer, on account of being the patentee, could not shift the 
burden of its patent meeting the reasonable requirements of the public to a third party. See 
Bayer v. Natco (Decision of the IPAB, Chennai), supra note 207, at 23 (“The law is clear that, 
the requirements and conditions, for grant of compulsory license must be decided with 
reference to the patentee alone and not a party whose presence itself is litigious. . . . 
Therefore, for deciding whether the conditions of section 84 are satisfied, we will not take into 
account the presence of Cipla.”). 
221. See id. at 37-38. 
222. Id. at 39-40. 
223. Id. at 43 (“[W]ith regard to section 84(1)(c) [of the Patents Act, 1970], we find that the word 
‘worked’ must be decided on a case to case basis and it may be proved in a given case, that 
‘working’ can be done only by way of import, but that cannot apply to all other cases. The 
patentee must show why [the patent] could not be locally manufactured. A mere statement to 
that effect is not sufficient there must be evidence.”). 
224. Id. at 44-45 (“[The] UNDP specifically recommends that the rate of royalty be set at 4% and 
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D. The Scapegoats Rejoice: Subsequent History of the IPAB’s 
Decision, its Aftermath in India and the International World, 
and Options Before Bayer  
With all its options exhausted under the purview of the Patents Act of 1970, 
Bayer challenged the reasonableness of the IPAB’s decision by invoking the writ 
jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of 
India.225 On July 15, 2014, a division bench of the Bombay High Court refused to 
interfere with the decision of the IPAB, thus upholding the compulsory license 
granted by the Controller of Patents in Mumbai to Natco for manufacturing and 
marketing generic copies of Nexavar.226 Bayer, thereafter, filed a special leave 
petition before the Supreme Court of India, challenging the Bombay High Court’s 
dismissal of its case.227 On December 12, 2014, dismissed the special leave petition 
filed by Bayer, Stating that it was not “inclined to interfere”, the Supreme Court of 
India dismissed the special leave petition filed by Bayer, with a caveat that all 
questions of law in the matter shall remain open.228  
This issuance of the compulsory license to Natco for manufacturing and 
marketing generic copies of Bayer’s Nexavar marks a new milestone in the realm 
of compulsory patent licensing of pharmaceutical patents in India.229  While 
patentee drug manufacturers are decrying the decision,230 generic drug 
manufacturers and support groups representing civil society have hailed the 
 
adjusted upwards as much as 2% for products of particular therapeutic value or reduced as 
much as 2% when the development of the product has been partly supported with public funds 
. . . . [Given that the manufacturing and marketing of Nexavar was wholly a privately-funded 
initiative, the IPAB reasoned that Bayer had] a genuine reason for revision of royalty. . . . 
[Accordingly, the royalty that had been fixed by the Controller of Patents at 6% of the net 
sales of the drug on a quarterly basis was] increase[d] [by] one percent.”). 
225.   Bayer v. Natco (Decision of the Bombay High Court), supra note 115, at 2. 
226.    Id. at 52. 
227.    Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 30145 / 2014, Dec. 12, 
            2014, 1 (Supreme Court of India). 
228.    Id. 
229. See Shamnad Basheer, Compulsory Licensing is Not a Bad Word, SPICY IP INDIA (Mar. 5, 
2013, 11:59 AM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2013/03/compulsory-licensing-is-not-bad-
word.html (last visited June 30, 2015). 
230. See, e.g.,U.S.-India Trade Relations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Trade 
Subcomm., 2013 Leg., 113th Sess. 7 (2013) (written testimony of Roy F. Waldron, Chief IP 
Counsel, Pfizer, Inc.), (“Compulsory licenses are intended for use in extraordinary situations of 
extreme urgency or other national emergency to meet the legitimate needs of the public. Often, 
however, compulsory licenses may be used by competitors as a means to obtain authorization to 
use or ttransfer technology developed by others without having to pay the substantial costs 
associated with developing and testing the product. These copiers want to obtain a free ride or use 
the technology at a much-reduced cost. Also, compulsory licenses are inappropriately viewed by 
some governments as part of their industrial policy to establish domestic production or to reduce 
government expenditures for medicines.”). 
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compulsory license decision as a breakthrough in affordable and equitable 
healthcare in India.231  
 The decision in Bayer v. Natco has not been well-received by the United 
States and the European Union, who view India’s compulsory license provisions as 
an impediment to foreign investments and a roadblock to effective trade 
negotiations.232  Perceiving compulsory licensing as a threat to pharmaceutical 
innovation, nations like the United States have the option of imposing trade 
sanctions in its trade agreements with India,233 or challenging India’s compulsory 
license provisions before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.234 
Having fought and lost its case up to the highest dispute settlement forums in 
India, what now are the options available to Bayer? There is a provision under the 
Patents Act of 1970 whereby Bayer, upon the expiration of two years from the date 
of the compulsory order, can apply for revocation of the order if Natco fails to work 
the generic version of Nexavar in India.235  It may be relevant to recall here that 
Bayer has been fighting a patent infringement claim against Natco at the High 
Court of Delhi.236  Ordinarily, the compulsory license issued to Natco in respect of 
Nexavar should, ipso facto, render Bayer’s patent infringement suit infructuous.  
However, in its order dated May 31, 2013, the High Court of Delhi allowed Bayer 
to persist its patent infringement claim because the claim was filed before Natco 
 
231. See, e.g., Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s First Compulsory License Upheld, But Legal Fights Likely 
to Continue, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/04/indias-first-
compulsory-licence-upheld-but-legal-fights-likely-to-continue/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2013) 
(“[C]ompulsory licenses will be on the rise all over the world because it is the middle path between 
extreme patent protectionism and patent abolitionism.”). 
232. See Sukanya Narain, The NATCO Decision: Bringing Into the Indian Patent Practice The TRIPS 
Flexibility of Compulsory Licensing, 10 (Apr. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript, National Law 
University, Jodhpur), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2072435 
(reporting the Special 301 comments to the US Trade Representative with regards to the 
compulsory licensing provisions in India’s Patents Act, whereby the recommendation of 
eliminating price as a trigger for issuing compulsory license under Section 84(1)(b) in order to 
comply with TRIPS, has been proposed). 
233. Reichman, supra note 26, at 259 (2009) (“A risk that the patentees’ governments will retaliate 
with trade sanctions that could ‘cripple the economy of the licensing nation.’”). 
234. International IP Enforcement: Protecting Patents, Trade Secrets and Market Access: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and 
the Internet, 2012 Leg., 112th Sess. 2 (June 27, 2012) (statement of Teresa Stanek Rea, 
Deputy Director, USPTO), available at http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/ 
collection/p266901coll4/id/4117 (observing that bringing a WTO case against India’s 
compulsory licensing provisions is one of the tools available to the USPTO that should be 
considered). 
235. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 85. 
236. Bayer v. Natco (Patent Infringement Suite Before the Delhi High Court), supra note 191. As of 
June 30, 2015, this case continues to be pending and all interlocutory orders passed so far in this 
matter can be referenced via the official website of the High Court of Delhi. 
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filed its compulsory license application.237  Therefore, if Bayer eventually wins its 
patent infringement claim against Natco, it may become entitled to damages to the 
extent of injury suffered before the compulsory license was issued. 
Albeit the decision in Bayer v. Natco can rightfully be characterized as one 
resulting in the issuance of India’s first compulsory license for a patented drug, 
this case was not the first time that compulsory patent licensing provisions were 
invoked under the Patents Act of 1970.238  Before Natco filed its compulsory license 
application in 2011, three compulsory patent license applications for 
pharmaceutical drugs had already been filed in India.  Two of these were filed by 
Natco in 2007 under section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970, seeking compulsory 
licenses for F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd.’s Tarceva® and Pfizer, Inc.’s SUTENT®, 
respectively, to manufacture and export the generic copies of these drugs to Nepal 
in order to address the country’s health crisis.239  Natco reportedly withdrew both 
its compulsory license applications in 2008, reasoning that the procedure under 
section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970 was too cumbersome.240 Aside from these 
two applications, a third compulsory license application was filed by Cipla Ltd. in 
2011 for a compulsory license for Merck Sharp and Dohme’s ISENTRESS®, 
invoking section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970.241 Soon thereafter, BDR 
Pharmaceuticals International Pvt. Ltd. (BDR) filed a compulsory license 
application in March 2013, under section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970, seeking 
a compulsory license for Bristol-Myers Squibb’s SPRYCEL®, though this 
application was eventually rejected for want of procedural compliance.242 On April 
9, 2013, the Indian government announced its proposal to issue a compulsory 
license for three life-saving drugs.243  More recently, on June 25, 2015, Lee Pharma 
 
237. Bayer v. Natco (Patent Infringement Suite Before the Delhi High Court), supra note 191, May 30, 
2012, available at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=121113&yr=2012. 
238. For a summary status report on compulsory license applications for patented drugs, which have 
been filed in India until June 30, 2015, see infra Annexure II. 
239. Shamnad Basheer, India’s First “Doha” Case: Natco, Pfizer and Roche Will Be Heard Soon, SPICY 
IP INDIA (Feb. 24, 2008), http://spicyip.com/2008/02/indias-first-doha-case-natco-pfizer-and.html 
(last visited June 30, 2015). 
240.    Shamnad Basheer, Breaking News: Natco Withdraws “Doha” Compulsory License Application, 
SPICY IP INDIA (Sept. 28, 2008), http://spicyip.com/2008/09/breaking-news-natco-withdraws-
doha.html (last visited June 30, 2015). 
241. Rajiv Kr. Choudhry, Cipla Files for a Compulsory License Against Merck’s Isentress, SPICY IP 
INDIA (Apr. 5, 2011), http://spicyip.com/2011/04/cipla-files-for-compulsory-license.html (last visited 
June 30, 2015). On February 20, 2014, Mark Sharp and Dohme and Cipla announced that they 
had entered an “India-Specific Strategic Partnership, whereby Cipla would have a non-exclusive 
license to market MSD’s ISENTRESS® under a different trade name in India. See Aditi Tandon, 
Health Activists Concerned Over Cipla-Merck Deal for HIV Drug, THE TRIBUNE (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140222/biz.htm#1 (last visited June 30, 2015).  
242. BDR Pharma. Intl. Pvt. Ltd.  v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.L.A. No. 1 of 2013, Oct. 29, 2013 
(Controller of Patents, Mumbai). 
243. See Thomas Bolloky, Why Chemotherapy that Costs $70,000 in the U.S. Costs $2,500 in India, 
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Ltd. filed an application seeking a compulsory license for AsreaZeneca’s Onglyza® 
under section 84(1)(b) of the Patents Act of 1970, which was admitted for 
processing and is currently pending before the Controller of Patents in Mumbai.244 
V.   Conclusion: Carving a Middle Path for all Divergent 
Stakeholders of Compulsory Patent Licensing 
Given the inequitable access to healthcare in India, the government in India 
must strive towards the effective implementation of compulsory patent licensing of 
drugs throughout its territory. Towards this end, a few strategies for the 
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing, that would also result in facilitating 
public access to expensively priced branded drugs, are elucidated in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
A. Ironing Out the Ambiguities in the Compulsory Licensing 
Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement 
Although article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement provides a prototype framework for 
the enforcement of compulsory licensing provisions, it contains provisions that 
have not been defined, thus creating a scope for potential patent abuses resulting 
from the ambiguity inherent in these terms.  The necessity of defining these terms 
further stems from the fact that a compulsory license agreement, being essentially 
an imposed contract, cannot be effectively enforced until its various terms and 
conditions are precisely defined. For instance, the expressions “public commercial 
non-use” has neither been defined in the TRIPS Agreement nor in the Doha 
Declaration.245  It may be relevant to note that section 92 of the Patents Act also 
does not define or explain what may be construed as a “national emergency,” 
“extreme urgency,” or “public non-commercial use,” thus leaving the door open for 
a compulsory patent license potentially being granted without basis or by abusing 
the rights of a patentee.246  
 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/archive/2013/04/Why-
Chemotherapy-that-Costs-70,000-in-the-US--Costs-2,500-in-India/274847/ (last visited Dec. 25, 
2013). The proposal recommends compulsory licensing of three drugs—Trastuzumab, Ixabepilone, 
and Dasatinib—sold by multinational pharmaceuticals in India. While Trastuzumab is a patented 
drug of F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd., the patent on Ixabepilone and Dasatinib is held by Bristol-
Myers Squibb. Id. 
244.    Balaji Subramanian, Compulsory License Application Filed Over AstraZeneca’s Saxagliptin, SPICY 
IP INDIA (July 5, 2015), http://spicyip.com/2015/07/compulsory-licence-application-filed-over-
astrazenecas-saxagliptin.html (last visited July 12, 2015). 
245. Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 8 J. INT. BUS. L., 
137, 164 (2009). 
246.    See Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How Far it Addresses Public Health 
Concerns in Developing Nations, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS., 357, 360 (2010), available at 
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B. Balancing the Equities Between Generic and Patented Drug 
Manufacturers 
The most effective way to ensure that the equities between the generic and 
patented drug manufacturers are balanced is by paying due allegiance to 
procedural propriety in the enforcement of compulsory patent licensing.  The 
enforcement process for compulsory patent licensing must neither be overly 
adversarial, nor too expensive to administer.247 It should be administered in a 
manner that ensures that the terms and conditions of the license are amicably 
agreed upon and effectively complied with by the parties involved in the license.   
The government should take steps towards setting up “a relatively predictable and 
easy to administer” system of compensation or royalty payable to the patentee 
drug manufacturer.248 This can be achieved, for instance, by having in place 
precise guidelines or methodologies to determine the quantum or rate of royalty 
payable to the licensee and the manner in which it is to be paid.  Moreover, the 
Controller of Patents should exercise his discretionary powers with reason and 
rationale while enforcing compulsory licensing provisions. He should ensure that 
the compulsory license proceeding are conducted fairly and expeditiously, and that 
generic drug manufacturer adheres to all procedural stipulations when filing the 
compulsory patent licensing application. 
 
http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/10211/1/JIPR%2015%285%29%20357-363.pdf (as-
serting that the absence of a precise definitions of “national emergency,” “extreme urgency,” and 
“public non-commercial use” in the TRIPS Agreement has resulted in national legislations (such 
as the Patents Act of 1970) deciding the degree of flexibility in the conditions for invoking compul-
sory licensing).  
247. See James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, Access 
to Medicines and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord, THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1, 29 (2004). 
248.    Id. 
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ANNEXURE I249 
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY SHEET  
OF  
COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING PROVISIONS 
UNDER 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE PATENTS ACT OF 1970 
 










Patents Act, 1970 
1. The reasonable requirements of the 
public with respect to the patented 
invention have not been satisfied 
 
____ 
§ 84(1)(a) read with 
§ 84(4) &  
§ 84(7)(a)-(e) 
2. The patented invention is not 
publicly available at a reasonably 




§ 84(1)(b) read with 
§ 84(4) 
3. The patented invention has been 
worked in the territory of India 
 
____ 
§ 84(1)(c) read with 
§ 84(4), § 84(7)(d) 
& § 84(7)(e) 
4. For working  a related patent Art. 31(l)(i)-(iii)  § 91 
5. There is a national emergency Art. 31(b) read with 
¶ 5(c) of the Doha 
Declaration 
§ 92  
6. There is an extreme urgency Art. 31(b) read with 
¶ 5(c) of the Doha 
Declaration 
§ 92  
7. For purposes of a public non-
commercial use 
Art. 31(b) § 92  
8. For remedying an anti-competitive 
practice adopted by the patentee 
Art. 31(k) Proviso Clause to 
§ 84(6)(iv) &  
§ 90(1)(ix) 
9. For allowing generic copies of a 
patented drug to be exported to 
countries with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacities during a 
public health crisis 





249.    Annexure I supplements Part III of this paper by providing a comparative summary sheet of the 
statutory provisions concerning the enforcement of compulsory patent licensing under the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Patents Act of 1970, respectively. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.  
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 B. Terms and Conditions of a Compulsory Patent License: 
Serial  
No. 







1. A compulsory license must be non-exclusive Art. 31(d) § 90(1)(iv) 
2. A compulsory license must be non-assignable Art. 31(e) § 90(1)(v) 
3. The licensee must pay royalty to the patentee 
as settled by the competent authority 
Art. 31(h)  § 90(1)(i) 
4. The licensee must fully work the patent at a 
reasonable profit 
_____ § 90(1)(ii) 
5. The licensee must sell generic copies of the 




6. If a compulsory license is granted specially to 
address a national emergency or an extreme 
urgency, or for a public non-commercial use, 
the licensee must sell generic copies of the 
patented invention at the lowest prices 
_____ § 92(1)(ii) 
7. The licensee must predominantly supply 
generic copies of the patented invention to his 
domestic market, with the exception to export 
such generic copies in three circumstances: 
(a) to remedy an  anti-competitive practice 
 
(b) to address a public health crisis 
 
(c) if the domestic market for export is not 
     being developed  
(a) Art. 31(f) read 
with Art. 31(k)  
 
(b) Art. 31 (f) read 
with ¶ 6 of the       
Implementation    
Agreement 
 
(c) [no provision 
in the TRIPS  
Agreement]   
(a) §90(1)(ix) 
 
(b) § 92A  
 
(c) § 90(1)(vii) 
read with 
§84(7)(a)(iii) 
9. The scope and duration of a compulsory 
license must be limited to the purpose behind 
its grant, especially in the case of semi-
conductor technology, where such license 
must be used only for a public non-commercial 
use or to remedy an anti-competitive practice  
Art. 31(c) § 90(1)(viii) 
10. A compulsory license must be valid for the 
balance term of the patent, unless a shorter 
term is in public interest 
_____ § 90(1)(vi) 
11. A compulsory license must be terminated if 
and when the circumstances which led to its 
grant cease to exist and are unlikely to recur 
Art. 31(g) _____ 
12. The licensee must not  import the patented 
invention from a country that does not have a 
compulsory license authorizing the export of 
such invention   
_____ § 90(2) 
 Compulsory Patent Licensing in India, its Compliance with TRIPS, and Bayer v. Natco 
373 
ANNEXURE II250 
SUMMARY STATUS REPORT  
ON 
COMPULSORY LICENSE APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTED DRUGS 
UNDER THE PATENTS ACT OF 1970 












Year of Filing 
 & 
Current Status 








Treats advanced stage 
non-small cell lung 
cancer (NSCLC) 
Patentee: 
F. Hoffmann La- 











health crisis   
[§ 92A] 





2008, as Natco 
claimed the 
procedure under 
§ 92A to be too 
cumbersome 
 








stromal tumor (GIST), 
advanced renal cell 

























2008, as Natco 
claimed the 
procedure under 




250.    Annexure II supplements Part IV.D of this paper by consolidating the information pertaining to 
the current status of all compulsory license applications for patented drugs filed so far under the 
Patents Act of 1970. See discussion supra Part IV.D.  













Year of Filing 
 & 
Current Status 






Treats HIV infection 
that causes AIDS 
Patentee: 




















2014, as MSD 
and Cipla 
brokered a deal  










carcinoma (RCC), and 
differentiated thyroid 




















Granted in 2012, 
[Order of grant 
upheld by the 




High Court in 
2014] 




























Rejected in 2013, 
as BDR did not 





































Year of Filing: 
2015 
 
Current 
Status: 
Pending 
 
